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ABSTRACT
Recent scholarship highlights the importance of institutions to the processes of economic growth,
but the precise nature of their relationship bears further examination. This paper considers how the
evolution of legal institutions has contributed to, and in turn been affected by, major technological
innovations. The first section of the paper examines the U.S. intellectual property system. Patent and
copyright laws, and their interpretation and enforcement by the federal judiciary, certainly
influenced the course of technical and cultural change, but it is clear that they did not develop
independently of the state of technology and of the economy. Both the statutes and their
interpretations altered in response to the introduction and diffusion of new technologies. The second
section explores in more detail the impact of some of these technological innovations -- including
steamboats, railroads, telegraphy, medical technologies, and automobiles -- on the common law,
regulation and insurance. Such technological advances often led to institutional bottlenecks, which
then required accommodations in legal rules and their enforcement. Although the common law had
some capability for economizing on legal adjustment costs through "adjudication by analogy," the
socio-economic changes wrought by major innovations ultimately produced more fundamental
change in legal institutions, such as shifts in the relative importance of state and federal policies, and
in the degree of reliance on regulation by bureaucracy. In sum, the historical record of the evolution
of legal rules and standards in the United States indicates a remarkable degree of flexibility as such








 “I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions. But 
laws and institutions must go hand and hand with the progress of the 
human mind. As that becomes more developed,  more enlightened, as 
new discoveries are made, new truths discovered and manners and 
opinions change, with the change of circumstances, institutions must 
advance also to keep pace with the times.….”  
        --  Thomas  Jefferson  (1810)
1 
1.INTRODUCTION 
Recent scholarship highlights the importance of institutions in long-run economic growth, but the 
specific relationship is still not clearly understood, despite a plethora of research on both the 
theoretical and empirical aspects of institutions and economic activity.
2   Indeed, even in the face 
of evidence that such institutions might be endogenous, some empirical studies still treat legal 
regimes, patent systems and other forms of property rights as exogenous determinants of economic 
performance.  Moreover, legal structures and statutory changes are often discussed without 
attempts to distinguish between rules and their enforcement.   In short, there is a need for research 
that contributes to a better understanding of the sources of  institutional change, the specific means 
through which revisions are implemented, the impact of different rules and standards,  the 
feedback mechanism between economic factors and institutions, and the degree of substitutability 
across institutions.   This paper addresses such issues by assessing several thousand lawsuits from 
U.S. state and federal courts over the “long nineteenth century.”  The analysis indicates how legal 
institutions adapted to changing circumstances, and suggests that American economic success was 
partly due to the flexibility and transparency of its legal system. 
Law and technology are both critical for understanding the evolution of American society.  
As such prominent commentators as Thomas Paine and Alexis de Tocqueville have pointed out,  
U.S. policy has always been distinguished by the central role of law and the judiciary.3
   Moreover,  
                                                           
1  See http://www.monticello.org/reports/quotes/memorial.html, for inscription at the Jefferson Memorial in 
Washington, D.C. (taken from a letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1810). 
2 . For an excellent overview of the debate on institutions and economic growth, see Stanley L. Engerman and 
Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Institutional and Non-Institutional Explanations of Economic Differences,” NBER Working 
Paper No. 9989, Sept. 2003; and Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
3 Thomas Paine felt that “in America THE LAW IS KING”((Caps. in the original text), Common Sense,  Chapt. III, p. 
49, Philadelphia: W. and T. Bradford,1776.  Alexis de Tocqueville argued that American courts wielded enormous   3
its citizens stand out for their innovativeness and willingness to adopt new technologies, to such an 
extent that some have even characterized the United States as a “republic of technology.” This 
favourable view of invention and innovation was matched by the readiness of the judiciary to 
accommodate the radical transformations caused by innovations. The notion that our own era is 
unique reveals a somewhat limited appreciation of the cumulative impact of  such innovations as 
the telegraph, steam engine, railroad, radio, electric power and the automobile on American society 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.   Unprecedented technical progress during that 
period brought about discrete and measurable changes in the lives, lifestyles and livelihood of 
Americans that arguably exceed those of our own time.  Technological innovations also affected 
the scope and nature of  the law.   Competition policy, medical malpractice, nuisance, trespass and 
torts, the allocation of riparian rights and admiralty law all reflected the turmoil wrought by  
technical changes.  Advances in forensic science and technology transformed the enforcement and 
adjudication of criminal law.  Similarly, organizational innovations and the growth of national 
markets affected the nature of property rights, employment contracts and liability rules.
4   
This study focuses on the period between 1790 and 1920.  Clearly, technological change 
was not unknown before this time, but the innovations of the nineteenth century were significantly 
different from those of previous centuries because their sphere of influence was on a much larger 
scale.   For the first time in American history, innovations in transportation extended the practical 
boundaries of markets and social interactions to encompass repeated national and international 
transactions as a common occurrence.   Moreover, the expansion of virtually instantaneous 
communications networks introduced time as a central feature of such interactions and facilitated 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
political power,  since “Scarcely any question arises in the United States which does not become, sooner or later, a 
subject of judicial debate.” (Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J.P. Mayer, trans. George 
Lawrence,1835; New York: Harper & Row, 1969, Vol. I, Chap. 8, p. 311.) 
4 Technological change was not limited to domestic issues, for it also facilitated more numerous and more rapid 
transactions with other nations during peace and war.  Indeed, the very boundaries of  maritime sovereignty were 
constrained by existing technology, since the three-mile limit was determined by the maximum distance a cannon shot 
could reach.   Innovations like submarines, underwater international cables and manned airplane flights created 
jurisdictional and third party effects among nations which the legal system had to address.   The legal implications of 
naval blockades and sanctions changed as newer ships and submarines developed, and the maritime laws of agency   4
productivity changes through greater intensity of work and leisure.  As a result of both of these 
factors, technologies of the nineteenth century not only engendered conflicts between transactors, 
they also created a world in which the pace, scale and scope of third-party effects were potentially 
much larger.  This raised the policy question of how to ensure that technological progress 
increased social welfare, while minimizing potential costs such as unrestrained market power or 
undue redistributive effects.   
Although this paper centers on the relationship between the law and technology, it is 
important to realize that legal institutions comprise part of a complex network of institutions that 
function as complements or as substitutes to the law.  In certain contexts social norms or familial 
ties may serve as the most effective moderator of behaviour, independently of state-enforced rules; 
whereas circumstances that require little discretionary decisionmaking may be dealt with at least 
cost through administrative bureaucracies.  As Montesquieu and Adam Smith  pointed out, markets 
can be self-regulating, since the pursuit of self-interest in market-related transactions may be 
sufficient to ensure that participants cooperate in a civil society in a manner that promotes the 
common good.
5   Courts in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries performed  a 
comprehensive regulatory function that encompassed both the private and public realms.  They 
monitored and enforced pervasive moral and religious codes, and imposed restrictions on 
commerce through price controls, licensing, enforcement of contracts and property rights.   Soon 
after the first decade of the eighteenth century, as the scale of market activity increased, a division 
of labour across institutions led to caseloads in civil courts that primarily involved economic 
transactions to enforce debt contracts.   The legal system was therefore well-prepared to 
accommodate the economic challenges of the nineteenth century.
6 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and bottomry incorporated developments in communications that meant ships at sea were no longer completely cut off 
from their owners on land.    
5 For an empirical study of this issue, see B. Zorina Khan, "Commerce and Cooperation: Litigation and Settlement of 
Civil Disputes on the Australian Frontier," Journal of Economic History, vol. 60 (4) 2000:1088-1119. 
6 For a quantitative analysis of the evolution of colonial courts that employs an extensive data set of district court 
cases, see B. Zorina Khan, “`Justice of the Marketplace’: Legal Disputes and Economic Activity on the Northeastern 
Frontier, 1700-1860” (unpublished paper, 2003).   5
By the end of the period under review, legal institutions still formed an integral part of 
American life, but their orientation had altered because their activities were bolstered by an array 
of associative and administrative institutions.  This process of bureaucratization, perhaps because 
more visible than the decentralized decision-making of the court system, led some observers to 
highlight regulation as a twentieth-century innovation.  Instead, economic activity in the United 
States has always been subjected to the public interest: the major feature that has changed is the 
type of institution that accomplished this task.  However, which particular institution prevails – 
norms, legal system, bureaucratic regulation, government or market -- may be less important than 
the degree of flexibility exhibited, for institutions that do not respond to social evolution will 
necessarily become irrelevant.
 
The Framers of the American Constitution had been certain that social welfare would be 
maximized through the “progress of science and useful arts.”  They felt that this would be best 
achieved through a complementary relationship between law and the market.  The Constitution and 
early statutes were carefully calibrated to ensure a democratic, market orientation towards 
invention.  The wish to further technological innovation through private initiative created a 
paradox: in order to promote diffusion and enhance social welfare it would first be necessary to 
limit diffusion and to protect exclusive rights.  Thus, part of the debate about law and technology 
has always centered on the boundaries of the private domain relative to the public domain.  
Innovations in printing and publishing added to the complexity of the issue by introducing 
questions fundamental to a democratic society such as equality of access, opportunity to participate 
in progress, and freedom of speech.   Effective policies towards innovations, whether by statute or 
common law, therefore required a balancing of costs and benefits that was far more subtle than a 
monolithic promotion of the interests of any one specific group in society. 
Legal institutions exerted a significant influence on social and economic interactions, and 
technology was no exception. Intellectual property law had a direct effect on the rate and direction 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
   6
of  inventive activity and cultural innovations. Patents and copyrights, as the subject of  federal 
law, exhibited greater uniformity than if under state jurisdiction, and thus facilitated the 
development of a national market. As the creators of the intellectual property system recognized, 
inventors would be motivated to address important needs of society if they were able to 
appropriate the returns from their efforts.   Patent laws and their enforcement also had significant 
distributional implications for the types of inventors who could benefit from their efforts, and the 
nature of their inventions.  For instance, relatively low patent fees served to encourage ordinary 
citizens to invest in creating new discoveries, whereas an examination system increased the 
average technical value of patents, promoted a market in inventions, and encouraged the diffusion 
of information.  Technology was also shaped by other areas of  law, including rules regarding 
contract and constitutional issues.  
The relationship between law and technology was reciprocal for, just as law shaped 
technology, technical innovations significantly influenced legal innovations.  How and why the 
common law changed constitutes a standard debate in political and legal histories.
7   A classic 
source of dissension relates to the arguments of scholars who agree that American legal institutions 
were flexible, but contend that the judiciary was captured by the interests of a small group in 
society.  Morton Horwitz, in particular, admits that the antebellum legal system played a key role 
in the nascent industrialization of the United States, but argues that judges were biased in favour of 
the capitalists and industrialists whom they regarded as key to the promotion of economic 
development.  The judiciary reinterpreted existing legal rules in property, torts and contracts in an 
instrumentalist fashion to place the burdens of expansion on workers and farmers.   In so doing, 
judicial decisions led to outcomes that subsidized the efforts of industrialists, regardless of the 
statutes and of legal precedent.   Judges assumed the role of legislators to the extent that “judge-
                                                           
7 The standard legal histories include Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977, and  The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis 
of Legal Orthodoxy, New York, Oxford University Press, 1992; Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 
New York, Simon & Schuster, 1973; and James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the 
Nineteenth-Century United States, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1956.  See also Kermit L. Hall, The   7
made law” should be viewed as a derogatory term.   This “ruthless” transformation meant that the 
economically progressive classes were able to “dramatically … throw the burden of economic 
development on the weakest and least active elements of the population.”
8 The specifics of the 
subsidy hypothesis have been challenged, but it has proven to be a resilient interpretation of the 
American experience.
9  Its most recent renaissance has emerged in claims that regulation in the 
Gilded Age was an optimal response to the failures of the legal system.  Edward Glaeser and 
Andrei Shleifer argue that  large scale corporations wielded excessive power in the courts, 
“routinely bribed” judges and juries, and engaged in other legal and illegal tactics to ensure 
outcomes that were biased in their favour.  Consequently, the legal system “broke down.”  This 
“subversion of justice” proved to be inappropriate for the needs of the time and was replaced by 
regulatory agencies, which allegedly were less susceptible to the same corrupting influences.
10 
An alternative rendering of the history of American law can be obtained from the 
application of economic insight to the evidence.  According to the Coase Theorem, the legal 
system reinforces the market by ensuring that property rights are well-defined and predictable, and 
by minimizing transactions costs. Technological change in the era of industrialization affected the 
efficiency of private market solutions by creating uncertainties about property rights, by changing 
the costs of transacting and by increasing spillover effects.   However, the legal system helped to 
resolve the potential for market failure by defining rights, reducing costs of transacting, and taking 
into account third-party effects, through innovations in legal rules.  Such rules helped to ensure 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Magic Mirror : Law in American History, New York : Oxford University Press, 1989. 
8 Horwitz, Transformation, p. 101. 
9 Critics of the subsidy thesis regard the most effective rebuttal to be simply an objective and extensive reading of 
lawsuits and legal procedures.  They highlight the complementary relationship between legislature, common law, 
Constitution, and the judiciary.   Peter Karsten, Heart Versus Head: Judge-Made Law in Nineteenth-Century America, 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997,  argues that court decisions towards contracts, torts and 
property tended to protect workers and were not perceptibly biased towards defendants or capitalist developers.  See 
also Tony A. Freyer,  Producers versus Capitalists: Constitutional Conflict in Antebellum America, Charlottesville:  
University Press of Virginia, 1994.  Gary T. Schwartz critically reviewed Horwitz’s interpretation of negligence 
doctrines in “Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation," 90 Yale Law Journal 
(1982): 1717-1775; and “The Character of Early American Tort Law," vol. 36,  UCLA L. Rev. (1989): 641-718.  
10 According to Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, “During the Progressive Era at the beginning of the 20th 
century, the United States replaced litigation by regulation as the principal mechanism of social control of business.”  
See “The Rise of the Regulatory State,” NBER Working Paper No. 8650, December 2001.   8
that social costs and benefits were similar to private costs and benefits, facilitated the transition of 
resources to the highest-valued use, and also reallocated risk to those who could bear them at 
lowest cost.   Far from “breaking down,” legal institutions stood out as an important mechanism 
that allowed Americans to take advantage of the new opportunities wrought by expanding markets 
and technological progress. 
A key question in the economics of institutions relates to the extent to which rules and 
standards should be revised, or the appropriate boundaries between  credible commitments and 
rigidity, or flexibility and flaccidity.  New technologies in the nineteenth century raised questions 
about the relevance of existing legal rules, and ultimately caused changes in the law, albeit with a 
lag. Since the judiciary is by its nature conservative and technology is dynamic, the legal system 
potentially could have functioned as a significant bottleneck to further innovation.  Instead,  the 
common law was sufficiently flexible to cope with new discoveries.  This flexibility did not occur 
because of preconceived bias towards any particular group in society nor because of opaque 
precepts that “subverted justice.”  Instead, we can identify five transparent mechanisms through 
which technological change had an impact on the law:  technical innovations affected existing 
analogies; altered transactions costs; increased the speed and scope of transactions;  influenced 
norms and expectations at both the industry and societal levels; and changed judicial and 
legislative conceptions of the most effective means to promote the public interest. 
In the first instance, courts attempted to mediate between parties to disputes that related to 
the incursions of new technologies through a process we can regard as “adjudication by 
analogy.”
11    Early on, the law was stretched to accommodate discrete changes by attempting to 
detect some degree of equivalence across technologies, either by form or by function.    However, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
11 According to the court in Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (1990): “When strictly 
logical deductions from authoritative declarations of law -- in constitutions, statutes, and precedents -- do not provide 
answers to questions of law that must be decided in the case before the court, the court turns to analogy.”  However, 
the court in N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 cautioned against rigid analogies that preclude dynamic standards: 
“But no definitive choice among competing analogies (broadcast, common carrier, bookstore) allows us to declare a   9
inappropriate analogies tended to increase the frequency of legal conflicts or appeals, which served 
as a signal to indicate that revisions were insufficient.   Second, under these circumstances, 
inappropriate rulings increased the cost of transacting, and made it necessary for legal doctrines 
and legislation to change in order to encompass the new innovations.  The third mechanism was 
motivated by technologies, such as major advances in transportation and communications,  that led 
to a more rapid pace of activity, and thereby produced pressures for correspondingly rapid 
responses in the legal system.  Fourth,  judicial decisions attempted to enforce community 
standards and expectations, which were a function of the current state of technology.  Finally, the 
judiciary recognized that, in order to increase overall social welfare, the law must evolve to allow 
citizens the most effective way to take advantage of new opportunities.  In the words of the classic 
legal maxim: salus populi suprema lex est.
12  
The first section of this paper assesses intellectual property laws that the founders 
authorized in the very first section of the Constitution, indicating the central role they ascribed to 
law and technology in the future of the nation.  The United States created the world’s first modern 
patent system, and its effectiveness was reinforced by a federal judiciary that ensured property 
rights were secure and inventors were able to appropriate the returns from their efforts.    
Copyright law illustrated the difficulties and dilemmas that the legal system experienced in dealing 
with such new technologies as mimeographs, flash photography, cinematography, piano rolls, 
phonographs, radio, and “information technology.” The second section of the paper analyzes the 
effect of new technologies – steamboats and canals, railroads, telegraphy, medical and public 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
rigid single standard, good for now and for all future media and purposes.... aware as we are of the changes taking 
place in the law, the technology, and the industrial structure  related to telecommunications..... .” 
12 “Social welfare is the ultimate law.” It is undoubtedly true that, as the proponents of the subsidy thesis pointed out,  
a number of changes in the common law during the nineteenth century benefited corporations, and some decisions 
were harsh towards frail widows and workers.   However, the tendency was not monolithic.  Some doctrinal 
developments, such as the abolition of privity of contract, served to increase, rather than decrease, manufacturer 
liability.  Procedural innovations that benefited low-income plaintiffs included the adoption of contingency fees and 
class action suits.  Contingency fees were regarded with some disdain by “reputable” jurists as barratry.  But even 
those who disapproved of them, as did Justice McSherry, of Maryland Appeals Court,  acknowledged that  “Cases, 
however, may sometimes occur in which, without the allowance of such fees, justice might be defeated, and redress 
denied to the poor and the oppressed, and it was upon this ground that the Courts first allowed the payment of such   10
health innovations, and the automobile --  on the common law itself.  Technological innovations 
led to legal innovations, they changed the relative importance of state and federal policies, and 
ensured a continual debate about the effectiveness of the law in comparison to regulation by 
bureaucracy. 
A. INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY  LAWS
13 
 “Not logic alone, but logic supplemented by the social sciences 
becomes the instrument of advance” 
  ---  Benjamin  Cardozo
14 
  The United States from its inception as a nation had the option of drawing on European 
precedents for its intellectual property system but chose to pursue very different policies towards 
both patents and copyrights.  The American system was distinguished by its favourable treatment 
of inventors and the inducements held out for inventive activity, whereas the copyright regime was 
hedged about with caveats and restrictions.    The first Article of the U.S. Constitution included a 
clause to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”   George 
Washington issued a plea to highlight its importance, and Congress quickly complied in 1790 by 
passing separate patent and copyright statutes.   
i) Patents 
The American patent system was arguably the most successful in the world in generating 
secure property rights, broad-based technological change and economic growth (Figure 1).  
Legislators emphatically rejected restrictions on the rights of American inventors, and ensured that 
the legal system facilitated the operation of a free market.  Working requirements or compulsory 
licences were regarded as unwarranted infringements of the rights of “meritorious inventors,” and 
incompatible with the philosophy of U.S. patent grants.   Fees were deliberately kept among the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
fees. Afterwards the validity of such fees was generally recognized….” Davis et al. v. Gemmell et al., 3 Md. 530; 21 
A. 712; 1891. 
13  This section is largely based on B. Zorina Khan, The Democratization of Invention: Patents and Copyrights in 
American Economic Development, NBER and Cambridge University Press, (forthcoming).  See also B. Zorina Khan 
and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “The Early Development of Intellectual Property Institutions in the United States,” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, vol. 15 (3) 2001: 233-246. 
14 Benjamin Cardozo, The Growth of Law, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1924,  p. 73.    11
lowest in the world, patentees were not required to pay annuities to maintain their property, there 
were no opposition proceedings, and once granted a patent could not be revoked unless there was 
evidence of fraud.  As a result, the annals of American invention were not limited to the wealthy, 
corporate entities, or other privileged classes, but reflected a broad spectrum of society.  In an era 
when state policies prohibited blacks and married women from benefiting from their economic 
efforts, Federal patent laws did not discriminate against disadvantaged groups.
15 
  The initial establishment of an examination system was replaced by the 1793 model in 
which patents were awarded through registration, with disputes being resolved in the district 
courts.  When this system was reformed by statute in 1836, the United States created the world’s 
first modern patent institution. The primary feature of the “American system” was an examination 
of patent applications for conformity with the laws.  In particular, the 1836 Patent Law formally 
established a Patent Office that was staffed by trained and technically qualified employee 
examiners.   The French had opposed examination in part because they were reluctant to create 
positions of power that could be abused by office holders, but the characteristic American response 
to such potential problems was to institute a policy of judicial checks and balances.  In order to 
constrain the ability of examiners to engage in arbitrary actions, the applicant was given the right 
to file a bill in equity to contest the decisions of the Patent Office with the further right of appeal to 
the Supreme Court of the United States.  The historical record indicates that the legislature’s 
creation of a uniquely American system was a deliberate and conscious process.  The basic 
parameters of the U.S. patent system were transparent and predictable, in itself an aid to those who 
wished to obtain patent rights.  In addition, American legislators were concerned with ensuring 
that information about the stock of patented knowledge was readily available and diffused rapidly. 
The Patent Office was a source of centralized information on the state of the arts.
16 
                                                           
15 B. Zorina Khan, "Married Women's Property Laws and Female Commercial Activity: Evidence from United States  
Patent Records, 1790-1895," Journal of Economic History, vol. 56 (2)1996:356-88, examines the influence of changes 
in state laws on patenting activities by women. 
16 As early as 1805 Congress stipulated that the Secretary of State should publish an annual list of patents that were 
granted in the preceding year, and after 1832 also required the publication in newspapers of notices regarding expired   12
  The designers of the American system of intellectual property envisioned that the federal 
legal system would be closely integrated with every phase of the life of patents and copyrights, 
from the initial grant, its defence and trade, through to possible extensions. The value of patents 
was increased because patent issues were litigated at the federal and not the state level, with a right 
of appeal to the Supreme Court, which contributed to uniformity and certainty in intellectual 
property.   Federal courts from their inception attempted to establish a store of doctrine that 
fulfilled the intent of the Constitution to secure the rights of intellectual property owners. The 
judiciary acknowledged that inventive efforts varied with the extent to which inventors could 
appropriate the returns on their discoveries, and attempted to ensure that patentees were not 
unjustly deprived of the benefits from their inventions.  Technology policy was conducted at the 
national level and this contributed to the rapid development of a national market for innovations.  
  Courts explicitly attempted to implement decisions that promoted social and economic 
development through technological change.
17  The attitudes of the judiciary were primarily shaped 
by their interpretation of the monopoly aspect of the patent grant.   In Whitney et al. v. Emmett et 
al., 29 F. Cas. 1074 (1831), Justice Baldwin contrasted the policies in Britain and America towards 
the patent contract.  English Courts, he pointed out, interpret the patent grant as a privileged 
exception from the general ban on monopolies.  Apart from this proviso, the judiciary had total 
discretion in interpreting and deciding the ends that would promote public welfare.  The patent was 
seen as a trade-off, a bargain between the inventor and the public with a negotiable outcome.  In 
contrast, in the United States the patentee was not recognized as a monopolist per se, and judges 
had little discretion other than to fulfil the explicit intention of the Constitution.  Numerous 
reported decisions before the early courts declared that, rather than unwarranted monopolies, 
patent rights were "sacred" and to be regarded as the just recompense for inventive ingenuity.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
patents. 
17 “The Constitution of the United States, in giving authority to Congress to grant patents for a limited period, declares 
the object to be to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, an object as truly national and meritorious, and 
well founded in public policy, as any which can possibly be within the scope of national protection.” Ames v. Howard,   13
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, the acknowledged patent expert of the antebellum courts, 
indicated in Lowell v. Lewis (1817) that "the inventor has a property in his invention; a property 
which is often of very great value, and of which the law intended to give him the absolute 
enjoyment and possession ... involving some of the dearest and most valuable rights which society 
acknowledges, and the constitution itself means to favor." 
 
  The 1840s saw an increase in the number of patentees resorting to courts of equity, to 
obtain temporary or permanent injunctions against unauthorized users of their inventions.  
Preliminary injunctions could also be obtained pending common law litigation, if patentees stood 
to suffer severe losses.  But judges were alert to the possibility of unwarranted harm to the 
defendants whose enterprises could be broken up.  Oliver Parker's request for a wholesale 
injunction against 100 mill owners was disallowed because his patent was within weeks of 
expiring.  The judge was thus reluctant to issue an injunction that would adversely affect so many 
enterprises, when the patentee received no benefit from closure of the mills and would later be 
compensated by the payment of damages if it were indeed proven that the patent was infringed.  In 
the absence of antitrust statutes, equity provided a more flexible channel for mediating between the 
inventor's exclusive rights and a general monopoly.
18    
  One of the advantages of a legal system that secures property rights is that it facilitates 
contracts and trade.
19   Partly as a result, an extensive national network of licensing and 
assignments developed early on: in 1845 the Patent Office recorded 2,108 assignments, which can 
be compared to the cumulative stock of 7188 patents that were still in force in that year; by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
1 F. Cas. 755; 1833.  See B. Zorina Khan, "Property Rights and Patent Litigation in Early Nineteenth-Century 
America," Journal of Economic History, v. 55 (1) 1995: 58-97. 
18 The plaintiff in Smith v. Downing, 1 Fish. 54 (Mass., 1850), an assignee of Morse, sought a permanent injunction 
against the defendants, who operated a telegraph under assignment from Royal E. House.  After a detailed exposition 
of the incremental nature of the development of the telegraph, the court refused the injunction.  Exclusive patent rights 
allowed the inventor to benefit from the acknowledged property in his improvement; at the same time, such property 
did not extend to the entire field, because this would grant the marginal improver a monopoly that would halt general 
progress in the area.  House's telegraph was not only different from Morse's, but technically superior; hence to 
mandate an estoppel against his ingenuity and the defendants' enterprise would have been an "extraordinary" measure. 
19 For a synopsis of an extensive project that analyses the market for assignments, see Naomi Lamoreaux and Kenneth 
L. Sokoloff,   “Long-Term Change in the Organization of Inventive Activity,” (NAS Colloquium) Science, 
Technology and the Economy vol 93, Nov. (1996): 1286-92.     14
1870s the number of assignments averaged over 9000 per year, and this increased in the next 
decade to over 12,000 contracts recorded annually.  Assignments provide a straightforward index 
of the effectiveness of the American system, since a market for patented inventions would hardly 
proliferate if patent rights were uncertain or worthless. The secondary market in patent rights was 
based on the legally valid assumption that the patent embodied some intrinsic technical value.  The 
English system, which offered no protection to purchasers who were deceived into buying false 
patents, encouraged unproductive speculation and deterred the development of trade.
20  In contrast, 
American legal rulings voided promissory notes and other contracts for useless or fraudulent 
patents as part of a policy of protecting and legitimizing property rights.  
  The judiciary was willing to grapple with other difficult questions including the appropriate 
measure of damages when patent infringement likely lowered prices, disputes between owners of 
valid but conflicting patents, and the problem of how to protect the integrity of existing contracts 
when the law altered.  One such question revolved around the criteria for patentability.  The patent 
statutes required that inventions should be “new and useful,” but the judiciary treated the utility 
requirement as merely nominal, since it was the function of markets, not courts, to determine the 
value of patents.  Infringers who tried to undermine the validity of the original patent on the 
grounds of utility were reminded that their very use of the item overturned any allegation of lack of 
utility.  The major issue in any patent lawsuit related to the novelty of the invention, or the extent 
to which it promoted the progress of useful arts.   To 19
th century courts, patentable technology 
incorporated ideas and discoveries that were vested in tangible form, and “a mere abstract idea” or 
processes independent of a means of fixation could not be treated as the exclusive property of any 
one person, for this would limit diffusion and learning without any measurable social return.
21  
                                                           
20 For evidence on this issue, see B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Institutions and Democratic Invention in 
19
th Century America: Evidence from the ‘Great Inventors,’ 1790-1930,” American Economic Review, (forthcoming) 
May 2004. 
21 Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik v. Kalle, Circuit Court, S.D. New York, 94 F. 163; 1899. “Neither an idea nor a 
function, nor any other abstraction, is patentable,” Goshen Sweeper Co. v. Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co., 72 F. 67; 1895.   15
Consequently, several of the early “business method” cases dealt with copyright laws.
22   In 1859 
Charles Selden obtained copyright in a book entitled "Selden's Condensed Ledger, or Book-
keeping Simplified."  His method of book-keeping was infringed by Baker, who denied the 
validity of copyright protection for a business method.  The Supreme Court agreed that copyright 
protection extended only to expression, and did not provide an exclusive right in the idea itself: 
“The copyright of a work on mathematical science cannot give to the author an exclusive right to 
the methods of operation which he propounds, or to the diagrams which he employs to explain 
them, so as to prevent an engineer from using them whenever occasion requires.”  Exclusive rights 
could only be granted through examination for novelty according to patent laws, although the court 
refused to decide whether the book-keeping method was indeed patentable.   
When patents were granted for inventions that seemed to be for contracts or business 
methods, they were uniformly overturned by the courts, unless the idea or principle could be 
construed as vested in a tangible medium.   The Patent Office granted an 1891 patent to Levy 
Maybaum of Newark for inventing a “means for securing against excessive losses by bad debts,” 
which he assigned to the U.S. Credit System Company.  The patent covered a method of 
computing the industry norm for operating losses and constructing tables that allowed comparisons 
relative to the industry average.   When the owners of the patent brought an infringement claim 
before the courts, the patent was dismissed as “a method of transacting common business,  which 
does not seem to be patentable as an art.”
23   In litigation regarding the validity of an invention for 
"time limit" transfer tickets for use by street railways, the defendants sought to decry the patent as 
"a method of transacting business, a form of contract, a mode of procedure, a rule of conduct, a 
principle or idea, or a permissive function, predicated upon a thing involving no structural law."  
                                                           
22 See Bartlette v. Crittenden, 2 F. Cas. 981; 1847. 
23 U.S. Credit System Co. v. American Credit Indemnity Co., 53 F. 818; 1893.  The district judge, in ruling on the 
same patent, 51 F. 751; 1892, noted that “One is not entitled to a patent for a plan or method of business which only 
requires good judgment and foresight…. I do not intend to decide that a man may not have a patent for a mode of 
keeping accounts, or for a form of  tabulating amounts or statistics; but am clearly of opinion that this patent cannot be 
construed to cover a business principle such as a law of averages, which seems to have been the purpose of the 
specifications in this patent.”   16
The Circuit Court admitted that if the defence claim were true, then the patent would have to be 
invalidated.  As another judge had expressed it, “advice is not patentable.”
24 
In Earle v. Sawyer  (8 F. Cas. 254; 1825) Justice Story rejected the argument that patents 
required inventive inputs or efforts that went beyond those that could be produced by an artisan 
who was skilled in the arts.  Story was not persuaded by the “metaphysical” notion of patentability, 
for the standard “proceeds upon the language of common sense and common life, and has nothing 
mysterious or equivocal in it…. It is of no consequence, whether the thing be simple or 
complicated; whether it be by accident, or by long, laborious thought, or by an instantaneous flash 
of mind, that it is first done. The law looks to the fact, and not to the process by which it is 
accomplished.”  This common sense standard was entirely appropriate for an era where ordinary 
non-technical craftsmen and women could make valuable innovations based on simple know-how.  
A departure from this approach occurred when Hotchkiss v. Greenwood (52 U.S. 248; 1850) 
proposed that “unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method … were required in the 
application of it … than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, 
there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of 
every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skilful mechanic, not that of 
the inventor.” The Hotchkiss citations can be used as a proxy for the enforcement of  the 
nonobviousness doctrine.  The frequency of citations indicates that the Hotchkiss ruling long 
remained an isolated decision (Figure 2), but after the 1870s it became the precedent for decisions 
that invalidated patent grants on the grounds of nonobviousness and later for the absence of a 
“flash of genius.” The heightened standards likely functioned as a more effective filter in view of  
                                                           
24 Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope, 210 F. 443; 1913. However, it was decided that though “the case is perhaps near 
the border line, we think the device should be classed as an article to be used in a method of doing business” and, as an 
item to be manufactured, the ticket was patentable.  See also Berardini v. Tocci  190 F. 329; 1911 in which a banker 
obtained a patent for a code to wire messages to Italy: “It might be enough to bluntly hold that a code message cannot 
be an art, but that perhaps is interpreting the mere language of the claims too narrowly. It is therefore thought better to 
inquire what is an "art" within the meaning of the patent laws.  "In the sense of the patent law an art is not a mere 
abstraction. A system of transacting business,  disconnected from the means for carrying out the system, is not, within 
the most liberal interpretation of the term, an art. Advice is not patentable." Hotel Security, etc., Co. v. Lorraine Co., 
160 Fed. 469, 87 C.C.A. 451, 453, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 665 [1908].”     17
the great increase in patenting rates and technical qualifications among the population during the 
postbellum period.   
Another change occurred because early insouciant judicial optimism about the coincidence 
between private and public welfare had begun to wane by the second half of the century.
   By then, 
the courts had experienced the network of litigation launched by patentees and their assignees, 
such as William Woodworth and the Parker brothers, to protect national monopolies.  Justice 
Woodbury was prompted to dictate (Woodworth v. Edwards, 30 F. Cas. 567 (1847)): "The rights 
of inventive genius, and the valuable property produced by it, all persons in the exercise of this 
spirit will be willing to vindicate and uphold, without colorable evasions and wanton piracies; but 
those rights on the other hand, should be maintained in a manner not harsh towards other 
inventors, nor unaccommodating to the growing wants of the community."  Later courts would 
continue to grapple with similar issues in deciding the extent to which patent grants were 
compatible with antitrust stipulations.
25 
  The United States differed from the rest of the world in terms of its treatment of foreign 
inventions and foreign inventors.  Most countries had simple registration systems and allowed 
patents of importation, which supported the ability of their residents to appropriate and obtain 
patents for discoveries made by residents of other countries.  American laws employed the 
language of the English statute in granting patents to "the first and true inventor."  Nevertheless, 
unlike in England, the phrase was used literally, to grant patents for inventions that were original 
in the world, not simply within U.S. borders.
26 Although the United States varied over time in its 
                                                           
25  See B. Zorina Khan, "Federal Antitrust Agencies and Public Policy towards Patents and Innovation," Cornell 
Journal of Law and Public Policy, vol. 9 (Fall) 1999:133-169; B. Zorina Khan, "The Calculus of Enforcement: Legal 
and Economic Issues in Antitrust and Innovation,"  Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and 
Economic Growth,  vol. 12 (1999): 61-106; B. Zorina Khan.  Legal monopoly : patents and antitrust litigation in U.S. 
manufacturing,  1970-1998. NBER WP No. 7068.   
26 This question was settled early on: “The inventor must be the original inventor as to all the world, to be entitled to a 
patent.” See Reutgen v. Kanowrs, 1 Wash. 188 (Pa) 1804; Dawson v. Follen, 2. Wash. 311 (Pa) 1808; Lowell v. 
Lewis, 1 Mass. 190 (Mass.) 1817.  See Shaw v. Cooper, 32 US 292 1833: “it clearly appears, that it was the intention 
of the legislature, by a compliance with the requisites of the law, to vest the exclusive right in the inventor only; and 
that on condition, that his invention was neither known nor used by the public, before his application for a patent. If 
such use or knowledge shall be proved to have existed, prior to the application for the patent, the act of 1793 declares   18
treatment of foreign inventors, its provisions were much more favourable towards aliens than was 
true of  other countries.
27   The statutes of 1793, 1800 and 1832, restricted rights in patent property 
to citizens or to residents who declared that they intended to become citizens.
28  As such, while an 
American could not appropriate patent rights to a foreign invention, he could freely use the idea 
without any need to bear licensing or similar costs that would otherwise have been due if the 
inventor had been able to obtain a patent in this country. However, this comprised a flexible 
default rule, since it was quite commonplace for Congress to grant special exemptions to foreign 
inventors who applied for waivers.
29  In 1836, the stipulations on citizenship or residency were 
removed, but were replaced with discriminatory patent fees that retaliated for the significantly 
higher fees charged in other countries: foreigners could obtain a patent in the U.S. for a fee of three 
hundred dollars, or five hundred if they were British.  After 1861 patent rights (with the exception 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the patent void; and as has been already stated, the right of an alien is vacated in the same manner, by proving a 
foreign use or knowledge of his invention.” 
27“With the constitution, the English statute and the adjudication upon it before them, Congress have declared the 
intention of the law to be to promote the progress of the useful arts by the benefits granted to inventors; not by those 
accruing to the public, after the patent had  expired, as in England. This is most evident from their imposing as 
conditions, that the invention must be new to all the world, and the patentee be a citizen of the United States.   If public 
benefit had been the sole object, it was immaterial where the invention originated, or by whom invented; but being for 
the benefit of the patentee, the meritorious cause was invention, not importation, and the benefit was not extended to 
foreigners, in which respects the law had been otherwise settled in England.” Whitney al. v. Emmet et al.,  29 F. Cas. 
1074; 1831. 
28 The option of patents for importations was specifically rejected by Congress in its deliberations over the text of the 
first patent laws: An amendment ordered on December 9, 1790 [HR-121].  Received and read Feb 7, 1791. Vol. vi: 
Legislative Histories: text of patents bills 41 and 121, Patents Bill [HR-41], February 16, 1790: 
“Sec. 6: And be it further enacted, That any person, who shall after the passing of this act, first import into the United 
States from any foreign country, any art, machine, engine, device or invention, or any improvement thereon, not before 
used or known in the said States, such person, his executors, administrators and assigns, shall have the full benefit of 
this act, as if he were the original inventor or improver within the said States. [p. 1631] [fn 42, p. 1631: "The House 
struck out this section."] 
29. For a small sample of such foreign inventors, see: Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 1789-
1873, March 28, 1816: The bill entitled "An act authorizing and requiring the Secretary of State to issue letters patent 
to Andrew Kurtz," An act authorizing the Secretary of State to issue letters patent to Henry Burden, Journal of the 
House of Representatives of the United States, 1819-1820,  April 12, 1820; Bill S. 38, 16th Congress, 1st Session, Feb 
17, 1820: A Bill Authorizing the Secretary of State to issue letters patent to Richard Willcox;  H.R. 57, 20th Congress, 
1st Session, Jan 11, 1828, “An Act for the relief of Simeon Broadmeadow;” a petition of Richard Holden Approved by 
the President, Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 1789-1873, May 8, 1822;18th Congress, 1st 
Session, H.R. 230, 26th of May, 1824, Congress passed a law, authorizing the Department of State to issue a patent for 
a similar invention, to a certain Nathaniel Sylvester; Christopher Bechtler, praying that letters patent may be granted 
him for invention of two new and useful machines for the purpose of washing gold ores, without requiring the two 
years' residence as is by law now required. Approved by the President of the United States on March 3, 1831, Journal 
of the Senate of the United States of America, 1789-1873;Anthony Hermange, an alien, residing in the City or 
Washington, and Paul Steenstrup, of Kongsberg, in the Kingdom of Norway praying that letters patent for an invention 
may be granted, Approved by President May 1, 1828.  However, not all petitions were granted; see for instance, Peter 
Hirgoyen’s petition to be able to apply for a patent for a distilling apparatus (Journal of the House of Representatives   19
of caveats) were available to all applicants on the same basis without regard to nationality.
30 This 
liberality to foreign inventors was obtained at low cost since for most of the nineteenth century 
foreign patenting in the United States was trivial relative to the total.    By the end of the 19
th 
century, the United States directed its efforts towards attaining uniformity in intellectual property 
rights regimes across countries.
31  A significant motivating factor was the success of American 
patentees in penetrating foreign markets.  Americans inventors were also concerned about the lack 
of protection accorded to their exhibits in the increasingly more prominent World’s Fairs.  
The United States was the most prolific patenting nation in the world, many of the major 
American enterprises owed their success to patents and were expanding into international markets, 
and the U.S. patent system was recognized as the most successful.  It is therefore not surprising 
that the harmonization of patent laws implied convergence towards the American model, which 
was viewed as “the ideal of the future,” despite resistance from other nations.   Countries such as 
Germany were initially averse to extending equal protection to foreigners because they feared that 
their domestic industry would be overwhelmed by American patents.  Ironically, because its patent 
laws were the most liberal, the United States found itself with weaker bargaining abilities than 
nations who could make concessions by changing their provisions. This likely influenced the U.S. 
tendency to use bilateral trade sanctions rather than multilateral conventions to obtain reforms in 
international patent policies.  The movement to create an international patent system elucidated the 
reality that intellectual property laws did not exist in a vacuum, but were part of a bundle of rights 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
of the United States, 1817-1818, January 21, 1818.) 
30 During the proceedings to celebrate the centenary of the U.S. patent system, this liberality was noted as one of its 
essential features: “Our law gives to all men of all nations the same privileges, and recognizes to the fullest extent the 
international character of property in inventions.  In this respect ... the United States may claim to have led the world 
and to be leading it still.” F. A. Seely, “International Protection of Industrial Property,” p. 205, in Proceedings and 
Addresses: Celebration of the Beginning of the Second Century of the American Patent System  Wash. DC, Gedney & 
Roberts, 1892. 
31 The standard reference to the development of international patent harmonization is Edith Penrose, Economics of the 
International Patent System, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1951.  B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “The 
Innovation of Patent Systems in the Nineteenth Century: A Comparative Perspective,” unpublished manuscript (2002), 
discuss American exceptionalism and highlight the importance of low fees and an examination system in accounting 
for the nature of American patenting relative to other countries.    20
that were affected by other laws and policies, as well as by the scale and scope of economic 
activity. 
ii) Copyright and Allied Rights 
   Despite their common source in the intellectual property clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
American copyright policies provided a marked contrast to the patent system.   The subsidy 
argument is quite implausible in accounting for the differences between patent and copyright 
doctrines.  Copyright differed from patents precisely because the objective of both systems was to 
maximize social welfare, which led to an underlying rationale that was consistent with economic 
reasoning.   The political rhetoric of copyright has always centered about the creative individual, 
but then (as now) copyright enforcement was largely the concern of commercial interests.
32  Like 
other forms of intellectual property laws, the copyright system evolved to encompass 
improvements in technology and changes in the marketplace.  Copyright decisions illustrate how 
adjudication by analogy economized on the costs of technological transitions.  Still, many of the 
technological innovations of the nineteenth century were sufficiently different from existing 
technologies as to make judicial analogies somewhat strained, and  ultimately required 
accommodation by the legislature instead.  This area of the law indicates the extent to which 
judge-made policies were constrained by the statutes, and the extent to which legislative revisions 
were influenced by bargains among interest groups that could at times deviate from the goal of 
social welfare maximization.
33   
The earliest federal statute to protect the product of authors was approved on May 31 1790,  
                                                           
32 The fraction of copyright plaintiffs who were authors (broadly defined) was initially quite low, and fell continuously 
during the nineteenth century.  By the start of the twentieth cenury less than 10 percent of all plaintiffs in copyright 
cases were the creators of the item that was the subject of the litigation.  Instead, by the same period, the majority of 
parties bringing cases were publishing enterprises and other assignees of copyrights.  Although the judiciary attempted 
to ensure that the rights of all parties were fairly considered, their major concern was not to benefit publishing 
companies, but to protect the public interest in learning. 
33 . As the Supreme Court pointed out: “From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to 
significant changes in technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipment -- the printing 
press -- that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection. Repeatedly, as new developments have occurred in 
this country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary.” See 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,  464 U.S. 417 (1984).   21
“for the encouragement of learning.”   This utilitarian objective meant that, unlike European 
doctrines that enshrined the inalienable rights of authors, in the United States primary focus was on 
widespread access in order to increase public welfare, and incentives to copyright owners were 
viewed only as a secondary motive.  Registration secured the right to print, publish and sell maps, 
charts and books for a term of fourteen years, with the possibility of an extension for an equal 
term.  Major issues in copyright law primarily related to subject matter, duration, and enforcement, 
all of which expanded significantly during the course of the nineteenth century.  The statutes were 
substantively revised in 1831, 1870 and 1909.  The statutory extension of copyrights to musical 
compositions and plays was quite straightforward, as was the grant of property rights for 
engravings and sculpture. By 1910 the original copyright holder was granted derivative rights 
including translations into other languages; performances; and the rights to adapt musical works. 
The burgeoning scope of copyright protection that technological advances required raised 
numerous questions about the rights of authors and publishers relative to the public, and courts 
continually were confronted with the need to delineate the boundaries of private property in such a 
way as to guard the public domain. 
Although musical works were not protected by the first copyright Act, the 1831 statute 
allowed protection for musical compositions, at that time limited to sheet music.  The creation of 
mechanical means of reproducing music, such as the player piano and the phonograph, raised 
questions about the relevance of existing copyright rules, in part because the analogy between 
sheet music and these mechanical inventions appeared remote. Stern v. Rosey dealt with the 
question of whether an injunction should issue against a manufacturer of phonograph records who 
had used copyrighted music.  The court rejected the notion that copyright protection for music 
extended to such a different technological transformation.
34   Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 F. 584 
                                                           
34 According to the court, “We can not regard the reproduction, through the agency of the phonograph, of the sounds 
of musical instruments  playing the music composed and published by the appellants, as the copy or publication of the 
same within the meaning of the act. The ordinary signification of the words "copying," "publishing," etc., can not be 
stretched to include it…. these prepared wax cylinders can neither substitute the copyrighted sheets of music nor serve 
any purpose which is within their scope. In these respects there would seem to be no substantial difference between   22
(1888), which was argued in the Massachusetts Federal District Court, was brought by the 
copyright owner of a song entitled “Cradle’s Empty, Baby’s Gone.”  Judge Colt failed to accept 
the plaintiff’s argument that McTammany’s perforated piano rolls infringed on the copyright for 
the music, because he could “find no decided cases which,   directly or by analogy, support the 
position of the plaintiffs.”
 In 1908 the Supreme Court affirmed this position when it considered the 
claim brought by a music publishing company against the manufacturer of  player piano rolls.
35  In 
1909 Congress responded by revising the copyright law to give composers the right to the first 
mechanical reproduction of their music.  However, after the first recording, the statute permitted a 
compulsory licence to issue for copyrighted musical compositions: that is to say, anyone could 
subsequently make their own recording of the composition on payment of a fee that was set by the 
statute at two cents per recording.  In effect, the property right was transformed into a liability rule. 
The prevalence of compulsory licences for copyrighted material is worth noting for a number of 
reasons: they underline some of the statutory differences between patents and copyrights in the 
United States; they reflect economic reasons for such distinctions; and they were also the result of 
political compromises among the various interest groups in the music industry.
36 
The advent of photography created a new form of “authorship” which was granted 
copyright protection in 1865.
37  Photography also offered a ready means of copying books, 
paintings and engravings that led to copyright infringement litigation.  Rossiter v. Hall, 20 F. Cas. 
1253 (1866), dealt with photographic copies that had been taken of a copyrighted engraving of 
Washington’s house that the statutes protected against unauthorized reprints.  The defendant 
argued unsuccessfully that, since photography had not been invented at the time of the statute, it 
followed that this form of copying was not prohibited.   Although the judiciary was reluctant to 
appropriate the task of Congress and create new policies, at times they were able to adjudicate 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
them and the metal cylinder of the old and familiar music box; and this, though in use at and before the passage of the 
copyright act, has never been regarded as infringing upon the copyrights of authors and publishers.” 17 App. D.C. 562; 
1901. 
35  White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co,  209 U.S. 1; 28 S. Ct. 319; 1908.  Although some commentators today 
are derisive about the ruling in this case, it should be noted that this was the international standard set down in the 
British courts and in the Berne Convention. 
36  One of the primary interest groups in the world of music, the American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers (ASCAP), was founded in 1914. 
37 (Act of  March 3, 1865; 13 Stat. 540).   23
cases relating to new technologies by stretching the existing analogy.  This was apparent in the 
development of litigation surrounding movies not long after Edison obtained his 1896 patent for a 
kinetoscope.   The lower court rejected Edison’s copyright of moving pictures under the statutory 
category of photographs, but this decision was overturned by the appellate court: “To say that the 
continuous method by which this negative was secured was unknown when the act was passed, 
and therefore a photograph of it was not covered by the act, is to beg the question.  Such 
construction is at variance with the object of the act, which was passed to further the constitutional 
grant of power to “promote the progress of science and useful arts. ... [Congress] must have 
recognized there would be change and advance in making photographs, just as there has been in 
making books, printing chromos, and other subjects of copyright protection”
38 
  Technological innovation created new cultural properties to be protected, but many of these 
also facilitated infringement through mechanical means of reproduction that lowered the costs of 
duplicating copyrighted works.   Congress responded to the creation of new subject matter by 
expanding the scope of the copyright laws.   The legislature also repeatedly lengthened the term of 
copyright, arguably in order to support the value of copyright protection in the face of falling costs 
of infringement.  In 1790  the duration of copyright protection comprised 14 years from 
registration, with the possibility of renewal for a further 14 years; after 1831 the maximum term 
was 28 years from time of registration with the right of renewal for 14 years; whereas the 1909 
statute allowed 28 years plus extension for a further 28 years if the author were still alive.  
Nevertheless, it is worth repeating that the largely utilitarian rationale of the American statutes (“to 
promote learning”) precluded perpetual grants, and the term of copyright protection in United 
States was among the most abbreviated in the world.   Similarly, the United States offered the most 
liberal opportunities for unauthorized use if copying qualified as “fair use.” 
  Technological innovations that facilitated unauthorized copying heightened the tension 
between public welfare and private interests, leading some to question whether the fair use 
doctrine and copyright itself could endure.  However, it is vital to understand that fair use was not 
                                                           
38 Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. Cas. 240 (1903); and American Mutoscope & Biograph Co. v. Edison Mfg. Co., 137 F. 262 
(1905). Congress specifically granted copyright protection to moving pictures in the Act of Aug. 24, 1912, 37 Stat. 
488.    24
formulated simply as a function of technologies that influenced the ability to monitor use, nor was 
it limited because courts recognized the (moral or other) rights of authors.   Even if monitoring 
costs were zero, and all use could be traced by the author, fair use doctrines would still be relevant 
to fulfil the ultimate democratic function of legal rights in cultural products.   Without fair use, 
copyright would be transmuted into a monopoly right that would limit public access and violate the 
Constitution’s mandate to promote the progress of science.  In short, according to American legal 
doctrines, fair use was not regarded as an exception to the grant of copyright; instead, the grant of 
copyright was a limited exception to the primacy of the public domain.   
  The crucial need to balance public welfare against the right of authors is partly why 
copyright, according to Justice Joseph Story, belonged to the “metaphysics of the law.”  It was 
Story who first outlined the American fair use doctrine in Gray v. Russell (1839) and the more 
frequently cited Folsom v. Marsh (1841).  Fair use allowed unauthorized use of some portion of a 
copyrighted work, although exactly how much copying was permissible constituted (and remains 
today) “one of the most difficult points that can well arise for judicial discussion.”  Story offered a 
number of guidelines in Folsom v. Marsh., 9 F. Cas. 342 (1841): “we must often, in deciding 
questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value 
of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the 
profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work
.”  The fair use doctrine thus illustrates the 
extent to which policy makers weighed the benefits of diffusion against the costs of exclusion. If 
copyrights were as strictly construed as patents, it would serve to reduce scholarship, prevent 
public access for noncommercial purposes, increase transactions costs for potential users, and 
inhibit learning which the statutes were meant to promote.  
  The increasingly polarized debate today about the scope of patents and copyrights often 
underestimates or ignores the importance of allied rights that are available through other forms of 
the law such as contract and unfair competition.  A noticeable feature of nineteenth century case 
law was the willingness of the judiciary to extend protection to noncopyrighted works under   25
alternative doctrines in the common law, although the judicial mind in 1915 balked at the thought 
of extending free speech protections to commercial productions such as movies.
39   More than 10 
percent of “copyright” cases were decided using concepts of unfair competition, where the court 
rejected copyright claims but still protected the work against unauthorized users using fair trade 
doctrines.  Some 7.7 percent dealt with contracts, which raised questions such as ownership of 
photographs in cases of “work for hire.” A further 12 percent encompassed issues of trade secrets, 
misappropriation, and the right to privacy.   
  The development of the right to privacy is especially interesting, since it illustrates the 
creation of a new legal concept at common law to compensate for the potential of new 
technologies to infringe on third-party rights.   Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, in what has 
been touted as the most effective law review piece of all time, argued that “modern enterprise and 
invention” subjected the ordinary individual to unwarranted suffering that could not be alleviated 
through existing laws of copyright, tort, trespass, nor slander and libel.  Instant photographs and 
“numerous mechanical devices” led to the “evil of invasion of privacy.”
40  The concept of a legal 
right to privacy immediately entered into litigated arguments, and the New York Supreme Court, 
in Schuyler v. Curtis et al. (15 N.Y.S. 787;1891), quoted directly from the law review, but 
distinguished between private individuals and public figures who by implication ceded the right to 
privacy.  In a Massachusetts case three years later (Corliss v. Walker Co., 64 F. 280; 1894) the 
wife of the great inventor George H. Corliss tried to enjoin the publication of a photograph of her 
late husband.  The court rejected the plea because her husband was “among the first of American 
inventors, and he sought recognition as such,” permitting thousands of his photographs to be 
distributed at the Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia.  In 1903, the New York legislature passed 
a statute that levied criminal and civil liability for the unauthorized use of the "name, portrait or 
                                                           
39 See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio,  236 U.S. 230; 35 S. Ct. 387 (1915). 
40 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review Vol. IV (5) December 15, 
1890: 193-220.   26
picture of any living person" for "advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade," and several 
other states did the same.
41    
  The legal records of patent and copyright disputes yield valuable insights into nineteenth-
century society.  The significant differences in international patent and copyright laws in particular 
illustrate the extent to which these policies were market-oriented.  A nation of artificers and 
innovators, both as consumers and producers, American citizens were confident of their global 
competitiveness in technology, and accordingly took an active role in international patent 
conventions.  Although they excelled at pragmatic contrivances, Americans were advisedly less 
sanguine about their efforts in the realm of music, art, literature and drama.
42  As a developing 
country, the United States was initially a net debtor in flows of material culture from Europe.  The 
first copyright statute implicitly recognized this when it authorized Americans to take free 
advantage of the cultural output of other countries and encouraged international copyright piracy 
that persisted for a century.  The tendency to reprint foreign works was encouraged by the 
existence of tariffs on imported books that ranged as high as 25 percent.  Throughout the 19
th 
century proposals to reform the law and to acknowledge foreign copyrights were  repeatedly  
brought before Congress without any success. It was not until 1891 when American literature was 
gaining in the international market that copyright protection was granted to foreign residents, in 
order to gain reciprocal rights for American writers and artists.
43  
                                                           
41 The first unambiguously successful application of the right to privacy in court, Pavesich v. New England Life 
Insurance Co, 50 SE 98 (1905), along with some thirty other lawsuits prior to 1920, dealt with allegations that 
unauthorized commercial use of  the plaintiff's photograph violated a right to privacy. 
42 John Ruggles, who had recommended the changes in the patent system in 1836, was also a member of an 1838 
Committee to reform international copyrights.  He argued that “American ingenuity in the arts and practical sciences, 
would derive at least as much benefit from international patent laws, as that of foreigners.  Not so with authorship and 
book-making.  The difference is too obvious to admit of controversy.” According to Ruggles, an international 
copyright law was ill-advised, because “The answer is found in the significant inquiry of the British reviewer -- ‘Who 
ever reads an American book?’ ...the profits of trade and manufacture, and all the benefits ... would be, for us, on the 
wrong side of the leger.” Report to accompany Senate Bill No. 32, 25
th Congress, 2d Session, June 25 (1838). 
43 However, the statute also included significant concessions to printers’ unions in the form of manufacturing clauses.  
First, a book had to be published in the U.S. before or at the same time as the publication date in its country of origin.  
Second, the work had to be printed here, or printed from type set in the United States or from plates made from type 
set in the United States.  Copyright protection also depended on conformity with stipulations such as formal 
registration of the work.  These clauses resulted in U.S. failure to qualify for admission to the international Berne 
Convention until 1988, one hundred years after the initial Convention.   27
B.  TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
“Sooner or later, if the demands of social utility are sufficiently urgent, if the 
operation of an existing rule is sufficiently productive of hardship or 
inconvenience, utility will tend to triumph.” 
--- Benjamin Cardozo (1924)
44   
 
American society at the start of the nineteenth century was still overwhelmingly agrarian 
but by 1920 the United States had become the world’s foremost industrial power.  The advent of 
industrialization and more extensive markets created conflicts between the rights of farmers and 
mill owners, mill owners and their workers, as well as enterprises and consumers, all of which 
required legal mediation.   Technological advances and legal change had reciprocal and mutually 
reinforcing effects.   Property laws and  contracts attempted to define rights and allocate liability 
within a changing context.   In particular, tort law developed as a distinct body of thought 
independently of property and contract, because new technologies, urbanization and more frequent 
exchange among strangers led to an increase in the number of accidental injuries and externalities.  
At the same time, the costs of injuries created  incentives for inventors to direct their attentions to 
safety devices such as steam gauges, safety elevators, and more effective railroad couplers, air 
brakes and crossing signals.
45   The courts responded by quickly altering the standards of due care 
to incorporate existing technological options as long as they were cost effective.  
i)  Canals and Railroads 
The development of cheap and efficient internal transportation was a prerequisite for 
economic development in a country as vast as the United States, so it is not surprising that this 
comprised a key element of state policy and private initiatives.  By 1830,  even though state 
involvement was largely limited to the grant of charters, investors and entrepreneurs privately 
funded an extensive network of  turnpikes in the Northeast.  After the state of New York financed 
the building of the hugely successful Erie canal, numerous other public and private canal ventures 
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45 In the entire period before 1860, only 771 patents mentioned safety in the specification; but during the 1860s some 
1940 patents did so, and by the 1870s this number  increased to over 3021 patents.   28
were undertaken throughout New England, the Middle Atlantic and Midwest.  The United States 
also possessed ready access to natural bodies of water, and advances in steamboat technologies 
increased their importance as a conduit for commerce.  Between 1830 and 1860 national steamboat 
tonnage increased by a factor of ten and rates on upriver transport fell dramatically.  As a result of 
these technical and price savings, the effective distance between towns and markets was 
significantly reduced. 
  In the antebellum period some 650 lawsuits involved canals and another 468 dealt with 
steamboats.  Transportation along water routes raised many of the issues that the railroads later 
would confront, including the nature of state charters, the role and effectiveness of canal 
commissioners, compensation for injuries to passengers and workers, takings and just 
compensation, discriminatory prices, taxation and financing.  Many states, beginning with New 
York, altered their constitutions to restrict debt financing at both the state and municipal levels, 
because of their unhappy experience when financial panics adversely affected the funding of 
canals.   In the era of canal-building mania, the courts provided well-needed ballast to the airy 
financial schemes of canal boosters.
46  Some of these lawsuits involved conflicts between different 
cohorts of technologies: could canals and turnpikes block railroads because their charters were 
drawn up earlier and implicitly conferred exclusive rights that could not be eroded by later 
technologies?  The famous Charles River Bridge decision in 1837 rejected this view because if 
earlier charters ensured monopoly profits the benefits from competition and technological change 
would be reduced or eliminated.   Progress also meant that already existing property rights might 
have to be more narrowly defined. Thus, the old common law rule that property rights in land 
extended upwards and downwards without limit no longer applied, and courts allowed railroads 
and bridges to cross privately owned waterways and turnpikes.  New technologies required a 
balancing of the benefits to be derived from their applications against the harm that is associated 
                                                           
46 For instance, Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 9 (1852), held that a New York state statute, which authorized the debt for 
the Erie Canal Enlargement and the building of the Genesee Valley and Black River Canals to be paid from future   29
with their use.  They brought the possibility that economic and social advances could be blocked 
by hold-outs or by individuals with conflicting interests who threatened to make the transactions 
costs associated with innovations prohibitively high.                    
The use of eminent domain played an important part in the promotion of turnpikes, canals, 
railroads and telegraphs by reducing or eliminating such costs.  The takings clause raised questions 
about the security of private property, what comprised public use, and how just compensation was 
to be determined in a nonconsensual nonmarket exchange.  In the nineteenth-century transportation 
cases, just compensation for takings was ascertained through mutual agreement, by commissioners 
in an administrative process, or by a jury.  Legislatures determined the constraints of “public use.”   
Their decisions were straight-forward in the specific case of canals for transportation or railroads 
that, though privately owned, offered valuable common carrier services to the general public.  In 
other instances, the benefits to the public were less direct, but this did not entirely rule out the 
application of the doctrine of eminent domain.  In 1832 Jasper Scudder brought a case in equity 
against the Trenton Delaware Falls Company  (1 N.J. Eq. 694; 1832) which was incorporated to 
create water power for some seventy manufacturing mills.  Scudder’s counsel argued that the 
corporation was created only for private purposes since the benefits of the water mills would 
derive solely to private individuals, thus it was inappropriate to allow the use of eminent domain.  
The Chancellor rejected this viewpoint because manufacturing enterprises, though admittedly 
private, contributed to employment and general economic prosperity, and indeed promised to 
generate far larger communal benefits than some turnpikes actually produced.
47 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
canal revenue surpluses, was unconstitutional. 
47 “The water power about to be created, will be sufficient for the erection of seventy mills, and factories, and other 
works dependent on such power. It will  be located at the seat of government, at the head of tide water, and in a 
flourishing and populous district of  country. It will be no experiment in a country like ours; and, judging from the 
results in other places, we may make a sufficiently accurate calculation as to the result here. Take the town of Paterson 
as an example. The water power there is in the hands of individuals--a company like this. They are under no obligation 
to lease or sell any mills or privileges to the public; and yet see the result of a few years' operation. Paterson is now the 
manufacturing emporium of the state, with a population of eight thousand souls. It has increased the value of property 
in all that district of country; opened a market for the produce of the soil, and given a  stimulus to industry of every 
kind. May we not hope that a similar benefit may be experienced here?” See also The Proprietors of Sudbury 
Meadows versus The Proprietors of the Middlesex Canal,. 40 Mass. 36 (1839); and Rubottom v. M’Clure, 4 Blackf. 
505 (1838).   30
To an even greater extent than canals, railroads quickly gained public approval and became 
a symbol of American progress.
48  Economic historians rightly caution against an inflated 
assessment of the role of locomotives in the nineteenth century economy, given the existence of 
viable alternatives, but it is undoubtedly true that the significance of railways increased over this 
period in terms of use, employment, and social impact.
49  Courts demonstrated a readiness to 
ensure that the common law kept up with innovations in transportation, since "To say that a new 
mode of passage shall be banished from the streets, no matter how much the general good may 
require it, simply because the streets were not so used in the days of Blackstone, would hardly 
comport with the advancement and enlightenment of the present age.
"50 
The benefits from all improvements in internal transportation came at a higher risk if only 
because of the growth in the number of transactions.  Steamboats proved to be especially 
hazardous because of fires from sparks, and accidents when high pressure boilers exploded.  This 
led to the passage of federal statutes in 1838 and 1852 that attempted to regulate safety and 
assigned the burden of proof  in negligence cases on steamboat owners and captains.
51  An 
enduring legal legacy arose after the scale of railroad injuries mounted rapidly after the Civil War.  
In 1890 over 29,000 individuals were injured in railroad accidents and 6,335 persons were killed, 
                                                           
48 Albert Fishlow surveys the development of transportation in “Internal Transportation in the Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Centuries,” in The Cambridge Economic History of the United States, Vol. II, (eds) Stanley L. Engerman 
and Robert E. Gallman, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (2000):543-642. The law of railroads has been 
discussed in a large number of books and articles, the most comprehensive of which is James W. Ely’s Railroads and 
American Law, Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 2001.  Ely emphasizes the role of legislators and inefficient 
regulation in the decline of the railroads. 
49  Justice Caruthers of the Tennessee Supreme Court lyrically wrote in 33 Tenn. 637 (1854) that “the common dirt 
road for wagons is superseded by turnpikes, and these again by the railroad. … Blessings innumerable, prosperity 
unexampled, have marked the progress of this master improvement of the age. Activity, industry, enterprise and 
wealth seem to spring up as if by enchantment, wherever the iron track has been laid, or the locomotive moved.” In 
1840 7,000 individuals were employed in the railway industry, compared to 95,000 in ocean vessels.  Also in that year 
491 miles of new tracks were laid, and some 2,818 miles of road were in operation.  By 1870 160,000 employees 
worked for the railroads, a number that surpassed ocean transportation, whereas almost 53,000 miles of tracks were in 
operation.  The growth of passenger service was equally rapid, and in 1870 passenger revenue service exceeded $108 
million, but this was significantly lower than the $294 million generated from freight.  See Historical Statistics of the 
United States.  
50 Hiram P. Moses et al. v. The Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago R.R. Co. 21 Ill. 516,   523. (1859). 
51 July 7th, 1838, “Act to provide for the better security of the lives of passengers on board of vessels propelled, in 
whole or in part, by steam," Sec. 13, 5 U.S. Statutes at Large 306 (1838). The issue of accidents on steamboats is 
addressed in Richard N. Langlois, David J. Denault  and Samson M. Kimenyi, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal 
Power Redux: The Evolution of Safety on the Western Rivers,” University of Connecticut Working Paper 1995.  For a   31
and in 1913 injuries attained the quite astonishing level of 200,308 with almost 11,000 fatalities in 
one year alone.  
The debate over the impetus for the imposition of regulations and their efficacy has still not 
been resolved.  Some economists have argued that, while regulatory policies succeeded in 
generating and funding useful research, the improvements in safety were predominantly due to 
private initiatives which would have proceeded in the absence of federal regulation.  Figure 3 
presents the annual number of patents granted for railroad safety, and for safety-related inventions 
in general,  expressed as a percent of all patents.  The two series are procyclical and behave very 
like each other until the first World War.  After this period, railroad traffic was substantially 
reduced, and patents for railroad safety fell relative to overall safety patents.  Both series suggest 
that investments in safety-related innovations were primarily responding to the market rather than 
to regulation.  In particular, Interstate Commerce Commission oversight of the railroads from 1887 
and the introduction of federal railroad safety legislation in 1893 do not seem to be associated with 
spurts in railroad safety patents when compared to safety patents in general.  These data bear out 
the findings of researchers who find little impact of regulation on the adoption of such devices as 
air brakes and automatic couplers.  When government intervention succeeded in generating the 
development of automatic train controls, the innovation  proved to be ineffective on both technical 
and cost bases.  The patent data suggest that we should not underestimate market incentives for 
enterprises to invest in safety and to self-regulate.
52   
Liability rules differed in ways that comported with economic logic.  The common law for 
unintended torts adhered to four rules in deciding liability: industry norms; the fellow servant rule; 
contributory negligence; and the assumption of risk.  The judiciary held enterprises to a standard of 
care that comprised the norm for the industry, and only punished deviations away from the norm.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
different view, see  John G. Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” Technology and Culture vol. 7 (Winter 
1966): 1-23. 
52 Mark Aldrich points out that railroads were not opposed to safety-related legislation, but they rejected provisions 
that mandated specific devices which might be incompatible with other forms of equipment and might become 
obsolete quickly. Mark Aldrich, Safety First: Technology, Labor, and Business in the Building of American Work   32
The industry norm criterion, by relying on established community standards, economized on 
information gathering by the judiciary.  The fellow servant rule was first upheld in a railroad case 
in 1842, and absolved the railroad from liability because there was contributory negligence on the 
part of another employee.
53   A rule of contributory negligence induced bilateral care for it created 
incentives for workers to monitor each other.  This made sense in contexts such as railroad 
operations where workers were mobile and had a great deal of discretion:  first, many injuries 
occurred because workers acted without due care; and second, monitoring and enforcement costs 
for employers were high.  Railroads that tried to introduce rules to alter hazardous but convenient 
habits encountered resistance from workers.   The assumption of risk involved the idea that 
rational individuals will weigh the costs and benefits of their actions, so an employee will engage 
in a risky activity only if he is compensated for the expected harm either through insurance or 
through a higher wage premium.  Thus, as long as the employer was not negligent or deficient in 
safety standards, there was little need for judicial intervention when employees in risky jobs were 
injured in the normal course of employment.
54 We can further examine variation in the application 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Safety, 1870-1939, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. 
53 Farwell v. Boston & W. R. R. Corp.,  45 Mass. 49; 1842. Liability rules give incentives for precautionary 
behaviour, and also have implications for informational and administrative costs: negligence rules give both parties 
incentives for efficient precaution but have higher informational and administrative costs; whereas, a rule of strict 
liability towards enterprises minimizes transactions costs, but creates little incentive for victims to invest in precaution.  
If firms are held strictly liable, and consumer demand is not very responsive to price changes, firms can increase 
prices, implying that the cost of injuries will be borne by consumers in general.  If consumer demand is responsive to 
price changes, shareholders in the firm will bear the costs of injuries in the form of lower net earnings, and the firm 
will tend to over- invest in resources to reduce harm. After the Civil War a number of state legislatures limited the use 
of the fellow servant rule in railroad accidents and in 1908 the Federal Employers’ Liability Act abolished it entirely. 
54 However, it should be noted that this approach depends on the assumption that workers have many alternatives 
from which to choose, and that wages will adjust to reflect a risk premium.  The empirical evidence on this point is 
hard to assess because of data inadequacies, but suggests that wages were indeed higher to compensate for risk, 
although workers were not perfectly compensated for risk-bearing.  Moreover, workers who chose to engage in risky 
activities may have had few alternative opportunities. A key guide to the impact of state legislation to offer insured 
benefits to workers is Price Fishback and Shawn Kantor, Prelude to the Welfare State: The Origins of Workers' 
Compensation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. Fishback and Kantor argue that the state laws were 
associated with greater certainty for working families.  They show that all parties concerned – firms, workers, and 
insurers – benefited from the introduction of workmen’s compensation, in part because workers paid for some of the 
increase in benefits through lower wages.  However, in industries where unions predominated, such as the building 
trades, employees were able to successfully counter the tendency for workers to bear the incidence of the 
compensation laws.  See also Price Fishback and Shawn Kantor, "NonFatal Accident Compensation Under the 
Negligence Liability System at the Turn of the Century," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11(2) (1995): 
406-433; Price Fishback and Seung-Wook Kim, "Institutional Change, Compensating Differentials and Accident Risk 
in American Railroading, 1892-1945," Journal of Economic History 53 (December 1993): 796-823; and Price   33
of liability standards in the case of passengers and freight. Although employees might be held to 
have assumed the risk inherent in railroad or other industrial occupations, this was not entirely true 
of passengers.  Hence, railroads were held to higher standards of care for passengers than for 
employees and, if a passenger was injured, the burden of proof was on the railroad to show why it 
should not be held liable. In the case of goods to be transported, once the items were conveyed to 
the train they were completely within the control of the shipper, hence railroads were strictly liable 
for freight.  Slave passengers could not be viewed in the same liability context as freight, for “the 
carrier cannot, consistent with humanity and regard to the life and health of the slave, have the 
same absolute control over an intelligent being endowed with feelings and volition, that he has 
over property placed in his custody.”
55  
Improvements in transportation and communications created a national market in which 
state laws were increasingly discordant and discriminatory.
56   These questions had arisen 
regarding waterways, when federal admiralty laws were applied to steamships engaged in 
interstate commerce, but Figures 4 and 5 highlight the role of railroad litigation in providing the 
impetus towards federalization.  Some states refused to honour charters  of ‘foreign railroads’ that 
were granted in other jurisdictions; others tried to add to the revenues of  their treasury by taxing 
interim transactions, or imposing restrictions on rates and operations even though the final 
destination was in another state.  As the figures indicate, the disproportionate appeal to federal 
courts relative to state courts comprised an integral part of the policies of the railroad companies 
well into the twentieth century. Their victories in the Supreme Court changed the interpretation of 
the Constitution, in particular the Commerce Clause, the prohibition of lawsuits against state 
governments in the Eleventh Amendment, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Fishback, "Liability Rules and Accident Prevention in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from the Early Twentieth 
Century," Journal of Legal Studies, 16 (June 1987): 305-328. 
55 Wilson v. Hamilton, Sup Ct. Oh., 4 Ohio St. 722; 1855. 
56 In the landmark Wabash opinion, Justice Miller asserted that “It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that the right 
of continuous  transportation from one end of the country to the other is essential in modern times to that freedom of 
commerce from the restraints which the State might choose to impose upon it, that the commerce clause was intended 
to secure.” Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific R’wy Co., v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557; 7 S. Ct. 4; 30 L. Ed. 244; 1886.   34
Amendment.
57  Railroad companies ultimately succeeded in obtaining legal recognition that the 
public interest was not consistent with constraints on market expansion that benefited narrow local 
interests.
58 
Several other significant legal doctrines were influenced by the public interest nature of the 
railroads, most noticeably in bankruptcy and reorganization.
59   Federal bankruptcy legislation was 
intermittent and largely unenforced for much of the nineteenth century until the passage of the 
National Bankruptcy Law of 1898.  State rulings initially followed the English bias towards the 
rights of creditors, who were generally allowed to levy against and sell distressed property on a 
first-comer basis.  This created perverse incentives for creditors to race to force the firm into 
bankruptcy even when the corporation might be viable in long run.  Clearly, state interests were 
not necessarily mutually consistent or appropriate for dealing with interstate enterprises like 
railroads.  The result was a legislative vacuum that became especially problematic during the panic 
of 1873 when almost a fifth of railroad operations failed.  Federal courts were reluctant to grant 
individual creditors the right to dissolve national corporations at the cost of losing the public 
                                                           
57 See Richard C. Cortner, The Iron Horse and the Constitution, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1993. 
58 This recognition did not occur instantaneously, but through a long process of appeals.  Railroads questioned state 
regulation of rates in the Granger cases of 1877, but were defeated.  The judiciary hesitated to apply the Due Process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and conceded the right of the states to regulate rates for undertakings that 
affected the public interest.  However, in the California Railroad Tax Cases of 1882 (13 F. 722), the court agreed that a 
local tax violated the railroad’s due process rights, and further was inconsistent with the equal protection provision 
because the railroad was taxed differently from other enterprises. The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately in 1890 upheld 
the view that state policy regarding rates was within the jurisdiction of the courts under the “substantive due process” 
clause of the Constitution. In  the 1890s 41 federal cases involved questions of due process that were raised in 
connection with the railroads, the following decade there were 87, and by the 1920s the number had increased to 449 
cases. These decisions enabled the federal judiciary to overrule state policies, and allowed them to support private 
property rights that the state actions would have constrained.  Although the Supreme Court abandoned the use of 
substantive due process to protect private property in the 1930s, the concept endured in other contexts, especially in 
the battle to promote civil liberties.   The railroads won a second victory in terms of the interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment that barred federal lawsuits against the states or state officials.  In Ex Parte Young (1908), the Supreme 
Court ruled that federal courts could prevent state officials from enforcing policies that conflicted with the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a decision that had lasting implications for the movement to end racial segregation in schools.  
59 Bankruptcy and tort laws in relation to the railroads have also been well-investigated.  Bradley Hansen, “The 
People’s Welfare and the Origins of Corporate Reorganization: The Wabash Receivership Reconsidered,” Business 
History Review 74(3) 2000: 377-406, finds no evidence for the view that courts radically transformed creditors’ rights 
in the 1880s.  Instead, he proposes that the features of equity receivership in the Wabash decision were consistent with 
earlier precedents, and with the attempt to further public welfare.  Peter Tufano points to the link between legally 
mandated governance mechanisms and financial innovations that allowed distressed firms to obtain funding, in 
“Business Failure, Judicial Intervention, and Financial Innovation: Restructuring U.S. Railroads in the Nineteenth 
Century,” Business History Review, vol. 71(1) 1997: 1-40.  See also Albro Martin, “Railroads and the Equity 
Receivership: An Essay on Institutional Change,” JEH, vol. 34 (3) 1974: 685-709.     35
benefits of a functioning interstate railroad.  Instead, court-appointed receivers kept the railway 
operating during bankruptcy while the firm was reorganized and financially restructured. Strikes 
were not tolerated while the railroad was under receivership, and lawsuits could not be brought 
against receivers during restructuring, although equity courts tried to ensure that existing 
management did not unduly skew outcomes in their own favour.  This gradual shifting of bias 
towards the rights of debtors became a permanent feature of American bankruptcy policy starting 
with the 1898 federal legislation that was enacted after the great depression of 1893.    
The process of railroad consolidation accelerated after the Civil War, and at the same time 
exacerbated the tensions between state and federal oversight of commerce.   As discussed above, 
railroads appealed to federal courts to mediate, but the figures indicate that the major forces acting 
on railroad concerns remained at the state level until the end of the century.  In 1887 the Federal 
Interstate Commerce Act superseded many elements of state policies, as did a number of other 
federal acts up to passage of the Transportation Act of 1920.  At this point, federal regulation 
influenced content, access, ownership, safety, pricing, consolidations and operations, not only in 
the railroad industry, but in other key enterprises such as electric utilities and the telephone.   
Despite the rhetoric that accompanied the introduction of federal regulatory commissions, 
regulation had a long common law tradition vested in court rulings towards natural monopolies 
and other enterprises that involved the public interest.
60  Moreover, judicial oversight was not 
made redundant by the advent of regulation; instead, regulatory and antitrust enforcement 
depended heavily on court decisions.  Although much of the historical focus has been on state and 
federal regulation, we also speculated about the incentives for firms to self-regulate.  Indeed, some 
have argued that federal regulation was instigated by railroads and electric utilities as a means of 
reducing competition.    
   36
 
ii) Telegraphy  
The telegraph, although not quite a “Victorian Internet,” emerged in the 1840s as the first 
commercially viable means of interstate electronic communication.
61   Telegraphy diffused so 
rapidly that by 1851 the Bureau of the Census reported that 75 companies with over 20,000 miles 
of wire were in operation.  These small scale enterprises proved to be inefficient, and a series of 
consolidations and exits ultimately resulted in the domination of Western Union.  In 1870 Western 
Union alone operated almost 4,000 offices and handled more than 9 million messages.  By 1890, 
its 19,382 offices were dealing with approximately 56 million messages.
62  Diffusion of this form 
of communication was impressive but (like the Internet today) the applications were 
predominantly among businesses rather than consumers.  Perhaps as a result of this business 
orientation, the law did not draw an analogy to newspapers or other print media,  nor did it raise 
First Amendment questions about freedom of speech.  Instead, the courts  and legislature stressed a 
comparison with postal roads, turnpikes and railways.  The Post Roads Act of 1866 designated 
telegraph companies as common carriers who were granted privileges including rights of way on 
public lands and waterways, access to free timber and resources, and recourse to eminent domain.  
In return, the telegraphs assumed the public interest duties of common carriers analogous to the 
transportation enterprises.
63 
  The Supreme Court of Massachusetts argued that, while the telegraph was undoubtedly a 
valuable means of communication, "Its use is certainly similar to, if not identical with, that public 
use of transmitting information for which the highway was originally taken, even if the means 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
60 “The act of  congress known as the "Interstate Commerce Act" contains few new features and was chiefly designed 
to carry into the statutes of the United States …  the  principles of the common law already enforced by the states in 
their domestic affairs.” Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 44 Neb. 326 (1895). 
61 See Tom Standage,   The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth Century's 
On-Line Pioneers, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,  1998. 
62 U.S. Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970: Bicentennial Edition, 
Washington: GPO,1976. Series R 46-55. 
63 William Cook, A Treatise on Telegraph Law,  New York, Siegrist Inc., 1920. Several law review articles have 
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adopted are quite different from the post-boy or the mail coach. It is a newly discovered method  of 
exercising the old public easement, and all appropriate methods must have been deemed to have 
been paid for when the road was laid out."
64 It was initially fortunate for telegraph companies that 
courts supported the idea that the previously granted rights of use also extended to the newer 
technology.  As the court in Magee v. Overshiner, 150 Ind. 127 (1898) pointed out, “If this were 
not true, … the advancement of commerce, and the increase in inventions for the aid of mankind 
would be required to adjust themselves to the conditions existing at the time of the dedication, and 
with reference to the uses then actually contemplated.” An atypical award of $2500 in damages 
that was given for use of a narrow plot of land illustrates the high costs if owners of the telegraph 
lines had had to contract new bargains with holders of public easements.
65 In states which rejected 
such analogies, including California, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, and Missouri, property 
owners were able to sustain costly injunctions and compensation for trespass or reductions in the 
value of their land. 
A second consequence was that the most significant doctrines in telegraph cases related to 
the duties of common carriers.   English legal decisions dating back to the Middle Ages raised 
questions of a duty to serve the public and to charge “just rates” in so doing, especially in the case 
of monopolies.  According to the Supreme Court of California in 1851, “The rules of law which 
govern the liability of telegraph companies are not new. They are old rules applied to new 
circumstances. Such companies hold themselves out to the public as engaged in a particular branch 
of business, in which the interests of the public are deeply concerned. They propose to do a certain 
service for a given price. There is no difference in the general nature of the legal obligation of the 
contract between carrying a message along a wire and carrying goods or a package along a route. 
The physical agency may be different, but the essential nature of the contract is the same.”
66 As 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Approach to Internet Interconnection,”  Federal Communications Law Journal,  vol. 54 (March) 2002: 225-279. 
64 Pierce v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75 (1883). 
65 See N.Y. Tel. Co. v. De Noyelles Brick Co., 154 N.Y. App. Div. 845 (1913). 
66  Parks v. Alta California Telegraph Company,13 Cal. 422 (1859).   38
common carriers, telegraph companies were not permitted to refuse any messages, although they 
were not held vicariously liable for criminal transactions conveyed by telegraph.  
Telegraph companies that accepted the designation of common carrier and its benefits were 
also obligated to charge reasonable, nondiscriminatory rates.  This stipulation allowed judicial 
oversight over competition policy well before the antitrust statutes were enacted.  Courts adopted 
an economic definition of discrimination, rejecting charges of anticompetitive behaviour if the 
differences in price were justified in terms of difference in costs.  For instance, in Western Union 
Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 44 Neb. 326 (1895), the court held that the telegraph company had 
not engaged in “unjust discrimination” because it faced different circumstances and costs in 
meeting the needs of a morning newspaper relative to an evening newspaper, which explained the 
differential tariffs charged.  However, courts varied in their support for quantity discounts, some 
arguing that this pricing policy suppressed competition and encouraged the creation of monopolies. 
  The established telegraph law for much of the nineteenth century accepted the common 
carrier analogy, but quite early on some noticed that the comparison was somewhat strained.
67   
The common carrier designation had an important implication for the telegraph company because 
it implied assumption of liability for the “goods carried.”  Railroads as common carriers were 
strictly liable for freight entrusted to their care and thus could be viewed as insurers of  goods 
consignments.  Under this doctrine, the liability of telegraph companies for their messages could 
be enormous, since an error in the transmission of a buy or sell order could amount to many 
thousands of dollars. At the same time, unlike the value of consignments on railroads or turnpikes, 
clearly the intrinsic value to the telegraph company of any message was significantly lower than its 
value to the sender and receiver of the message.  In order to insure against mistakes, the telegraph 
company required that the message should be repeated at a cost of half the regular rate, or else 
                                                           
67  For instance, a lower court in California in  1855 held that telegraph companies were not common carriers; as did 
the Maryland Court of Appeals: “A telegraph company is not a common carrier, but a bailee performing, through its 
agents, work for its employer, according to certain rules and regulations, which, under the law, it has a right to make 
for its government.”  Birney v. NY & Wash. Printing Telegraph Co., 18 Md. 341 (1862).   39
liability was limited to the cost of the transmission.   The courts were confronted with disputes that 
challenged the right of companies that attempted to limit their liability in this way, since common 
carriers were supposed to assume that risk themselves.  The stakes increased when businesses 
began to use abstruse codes or ciphers to protect their confidentiality and to reduce the cost of 
sending lengthy messages.
68  In one case, the telegraph operator transmitted the word “chatter” 
rather than the “charter” of the ciphered message, and the difference between the letter "r" and the 
letter "t" cost the sender about $1000, leading to an action against the telegraph company for 
$1054 in damages.
69    
In response, the analogy to common carriers was ultimately rejected.
70  Instead of common 
carriers, some courts treated telegraph messages as bailments.  Bailees were not expected to act as 
insurers, but only to hold to reasonable standards of diligence in completing their task, with 
damages generally limited to the price of their services.  Certainly, in the case of coded messages, 
it was impossible for the telegraph company to determine the relative importance of the 
communication, and to regulate the amount of care it took accordingly.  Western Union was 
justified in charging higher rates for important messages by requiring that they should be repeated, 
since “It does not exempt the company from responsibility, but only fixes the price of that 
responsibility, and allows the person who sends the message either to transmit it at his own risk at 
the usual price, or by paying in addition thereto half the usual price to have it repeated, and thus 
render the company liable for any mistake that may occur." 
71  This was simply the standard of  
limiting liability to the level of foreseeable reliance, that had been set long before in the classic 
1854 case of Hadley v. Baxendale, but its application to the telegraph industry was delayed 
because of the common carrier analogy. 
The advent of the telegraph introduced a number of other interesting questions in the area 
of contract law.  Previous methods of communication had depended on physical delivery through 
the postal service, whereas telegraphed messages ensured transmissions could be received within 
                                                           
68 Cotton exporters who wished to convey the message, "We make firm bid two hundred bales of fully middling 
cotton at 43-4d twenty-eight millimeters, January and February delivery, shipment to Havre" instead required Western 
Union to send the words "Holminop, New Orleans, Galeistraf, dipnoi, Granzoso, Liebsesin Dipnoi liciatorum, diomus, 
grapholite, Gradatos and Texas” (Minoprio, Forgan & Co., 5 Teiss. 79; 1907.) 
69 . Shaw v. Postal Telegraph & Cable Co., 79 Miss. 670; 31 So. 222; 1901. 
70 The Supreme Court in the landmark decision, Primrose v. Western Union, 154 U.S. 1 (1894), ruled that “Telegraph 
companies resemble railroad companies and other common carriers… But they are not common carriers; their duties 
are different, and are performed in different ways; and they are not subject to the same liabilities.”   40
minutes.  Time was therefore introduced as an important part of a contract conveyed by telegraph, 
and charges of negligence related to slight delays or errors in transmission.
72 Other cases 
determined that a telegraph message could be regarded as a valid form of contract even if it was 
not signed in handwriting by both parties.  As the California Supreme Court expressed it, “Any 
other conclusion than the one here reached would certainly impair the usefulness of modern 
appliances to modern business, tend to hamper trade, and increase the expense thereof.”
73 The 
development of international cable services further increased market efficiency and the ability to 
monitor agents engaged in distant transactions.  At least one outcome of this was to reduce the 
autonomy of agents at sea, and for the first time constrained their ability while at sea to enter into 
contracts that would bind the owners of the ship without the owners’ previous consent. 
  As with other technologies, conflicts arose because of nuisance and trespass, including 
claims that electrolysis destroyed water pipes, and that high voltage electric lines of urban tramcars 
interfered with telegraph and telephone transmissions.  Again, courts avoided assigning fault and 
instead tried to determine the lowest cost avoider, given the existing state of the arts.  The opinion 
in an 1890 lawsuit between a telephone company and an electric railway effectively described the 
role of technological advances in determining the standards of liability: “In solving these 
questions, we are compelled to bear in mind the fact that the science of electricity is still in its 
experimental stage; that a device which to-day may be the best, cheapest, and most practicable, 
may, in another year, be superseded by something incomparably better fitted for the purpose. It is 
quite possible, too, that the legal obligations of the parties may change with the progress of 
invention, and the duty of surmounting the difficulty be thrown upon one party or the other, as a 
cheaper or more effectual remedy is discovered…. the question of his liability will depend upon 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
71 Camp v. Western Union Tel. Co., 58 Ky. 164; 1858. 
72 “Prompt and speedy communication between different localities is one of the most urgent wants of the present age. 
…. Persons whose messages do not require the most rapid transmission and speedy delivery, take the cheaper and 
slower method of communication afforded by the mails. When a telegraph company therefore receives a message for 
transmission, the fair inference is that the sender resorts to the telegraph because he cannot or does not choose to wait 
for the  mail, and the telegraph company agrees by implication that his message shall be carefully transmitted by 
telegraph and delivered without unnecessary delay.” Dorgan v. Telegraph Co., 7 F. Cas. 918; 1874.   41
the fact whether he has made use of the means which, in the progress of science and improvement, 
have been shown by experience to be the best; but he is not bound to experiment with recent 
inventions, not generally known, or to adopt expensive devices, when it lies in the power of the 
person injured to make use himself of an effective and inexpensive method of prevention.”
74 
iii) Medical Technologies and Public Health 
Legal doctrines towards public health and medicine drew on metaphors that echoed 
policies towards transportation and communications technologies.
75  Advances in steamboats, 
railroads and the telegraph and telephone were presented in the rhetoric of the nineteenth century 
as the natural object of public policy because they were integral to broad based economic and 
social growth. Numerous other innovations such as the water closest or faucets were more modest 
in terms of rhetorical flair, but could be interpreted as no less significant to social welfare, and thus 
the proper scope for state law and judicial intervention.  Innovations that affected the quality and 
length of life fell into this category, including those that improved hygiene, sanitation, pollution, 
and medical techniques and devices.  Medical and health issues in especial were at the forefront of 
contentious legal decisions that related to private disputes and public laws. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century it is likely that cures were regarded as being “in 
the hands of Him who giveth life, and not within the physical control of the most skillful of the 
profession.”
76  Doctors tended to be trained informally, were unattached to medical networks or 
hospitals, and were accorded little respect.
77  By the 1890s medicine was regarded as an eminent 
calling, doctors had acquired significant authority, and even general practitioners appealed to 
current findings in both science and technology.  Health care had become specialized and 
organized within institutions, and the laboratory comprised an important unit in hospitals as well as 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
73 Brewer v. Horst & Lachmund,  127 Cal. 643; 60 P. 418; 1900. 
74Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. United Electric R’y Co., 42 F. 273; 1890. 
75 Stanley J. Reiser, Medicine and the Reign of Technology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978, is an 
excellent general introduction to the history of medical technology. 
76 Grindle v. Rush and Greene, 7 Ohio 123;1836. 
77According to one judge, “if there was any kind of testimony not only of no value, but even worse than that, it was, 
in his judgment, that of medical experts.” Supreme Court of Illinois, Rutherford v. Morris, 77 Ill. 397;1875.   42
for doctors in private practice.  The industrialization of medicine occurred partly because of  
technological advances that provided doctors with a formidable array of new diagnostic tools.   By 
the end of the nineteenth century these included the stethoscope, ophthalmoscope, laryngoscope, 
microscope, X-ray machine, spirometer, neurocalometer, blood pressure gauge and 
electrocardiograph.  Medical instruments facilitated tests and treatment for notorious diseases like 
tuberculosis, typhoid, cholera and diabetes and encouraged the professionalization of nascent 
specialties such as chiropractice. 
Medical malpractice suits became more prevalent relative to population during the period 
of early industrialization because of shifts in demand and supply factors.
78    Technological 
innovation affected medical malpractice through its impact on both the demand side and the supply 
side.  The demand for legal redress was partly related to social expectations that were raised by the 
achievements that had been attained in medical technology and by the diffusion of such knowledge 
among lay persons.  The supply of disputes likely increased because more doctors were available 
to offer second (and different) opinions and alternative services, and because of the rapid adoption 
and more extensive usage of medical devices.  Impersonal mechanical diagnoses and laboratory 
tests quickly became the gauge of effective treatment regardless of their actual efficacy.  
Ironically, to observers from other countries, American medicine had lost sight of the patient in its 
obsession with technological advances.  This assessment was complicated by the desire of patients 
themselves for more technological inputs in their medical care, regardless of  their productivity; for 
instance, the battery of tests that comprised the physical check-up became an annual routine early 
in the twentieth century. 
Technological innovations in the field of medicine had varying effects on the propensity to 
litigate.  It was true that they could facilitate more accurate diagnoses and improve the treatment of 
                                                           
78 The best work on medical malpractice from an historical perspective is Kenneth Allen de Ville, Medical 
Malpractice in Nineteenth-Century America: Origins and Legacy, New York, New York University Press, 1990.  See 
also James C. Mohr, Doctors and the Law: Medical Jurisprudence in Nineteenth-Century America, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993.   43
patients, but it was also possible that innovations led to more uniform standards of treatment which 
made defective practices more measurable and manifest. It might be expected that some doctors 
would be accused because they were less proficient with new devices or less up-to-date, and that 
current technologies might lead to unrealistic expectations.  The application of X-rays in medical 
litigation illustrates the role of new technologies in malpractice suits.  Wilhem Conrad Roentgen 
first published his discovery of “a new kind of ray” at the end of 1895 in the Proceedings of the 
Würzburg Phisico-Medical Society.  Only a few months later the use of X-rays was introduced in 
the United States and related patents were being filed, but ordinary citizens were also captivated by 
the discovery.  Doctors who failed to use the machines, despite the dangers of burns to patients, 
risked being accused of incompetence and a violation of their fiduciary duty.
79  Less than two 
years after the invention was introduced, a Midwestern jury was instructed to drawn conclusions 
from X-ray  photographs that were entered into the records.
80 Patients retained the services of 
expert witnesses who used X-ray evidence to prove their case, and doctors countered with their 
own proofs. 
As with other technologies, the law varied its standard of what was acceptable according to 
the state of the arts. The courts considered malpractice as a physician’s breach of his fiduciary duty 
to offer competent services, through negligence, ignorance, or lack of due care.  The physician was 
initially held to a standard of competence that took into consideration the type of community in 
which he practiced.   In 1824 a dispute in the remote village of Lubec, Maine involved a patient 
whose local doctor had allegedly botched treatment of a dislocated joint.  The judge felt that it was 
                                                           
79 Schmidt and Fuchs v. Balling, 91 Ill. App. 388 (1899) was brought as an appeal against a lower court judgement of 
$7000 in damages, in a lawsuit where the plaintiff claimed negligence in the use of X-Rays. 
80 “There have been offered in evidence two photographic negatives, taken by the Roentgen or X-ray process, of the 
plaintiff's injured femur bone. Scientists, by the aid of that wonderful and mysterious force we  call electricity, have 
discovered a process by which they are enabled to procure a photograph, showing the  shape and size of the living 
human body with a fair degree of accuracy. The negatives offered here in evidence in this case represent the shape and 
size of the plaintiff's right femur bone, somewhat enlarged, at the time the negatives were taken, namely, Exhibit A, on 
October 24, 1896, and Exhibit B, on May 9, 1896. …You are to take these negatives and consider them as 
approximately correct representations of the shape and size of the plaintiff's injured femur bone, at the time they were 
taken, and at the present time, for the purpose of aiding you in determining the extent of the plaintiff's injury, or in any 
other way in the consideration of the evidence in this case.” Tish v. Welker, 5 Ohio Dec. 725 (1897).   44
not to be expected that a doctor in a small rural town would possess the same degree of skill as a 
European-trained specialist in Boston.  Later courts argued that doctors should uphold a nationally 
accepted standard because improvements in transportation and communications had created a 
national market, with equality of access to information.  Despite this, the locality standard proved 
to be enduring and was still the norm even in the early twentieth century. 
The endogeneity of legal doctrines to technological changes was evident in cases that dealt 
with medical malpractice, but the converse was also true – that is, medical practice changed 
according to what was legally acceptable – as witnessed by rules about abortion.
81  The Supreme 
Court of New Jersey in 22 NJL 52 (1849) outlined the development of the law towards abortions, 
and pointed out that legal precedent uniformly was in agreement that it was acceptable to procure 
an abortion before the point of “quickening” in the pregnancy.  The opinion quoted Blackstone’s 
view that “Life begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother’s 
womb.”  Even after quickening the removal of the unborn child was deemed to be a misdemeanor 
rather than murder.  In the decades after the Civil War abortion at any stage was outlawed by 
statute throughout the country and criminalized as a felony.  However,  in a number of states an 
abortion was still held to be acceptable at any point in the pregnancy if there were valid medical 
reasons for the procedure in order to save the mother’s life, or to prevent serious bodily injury.  
Thus, the legality of each abortion depended heavily on the interpretation and state of medical 
knowledge regarding its alleged therapeutic necessity, itself a function of current diagnostic 
technology.
82   
Public health likewise had long been considered a legitimate concern of the state.
83   From 
the earliest years of settlement, local governments regulated the provision of food and sanitation, 
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United States 1867-1973, Berkeley :University of California Press,1997; and James C. Mohr, Abortion in America: 
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enacted laws to prevent nuisances, and called upon formidable police powers to deal with 
perceived dangers to community welfare.   Measures to counter infectious diseases could lead to 
especially draconian measures, including lengthy quarantines, forcible entry and the seizure or 
destruction of private property, criminal prosecution and imprisonment.  In 1796 a Congressional 
statute (1 Stat. 474) pledged federal support for state measures to ensure effective quarantines. In 
1809 Massachusetts introduced the first law to require vaccination against smallpox.  In an age of 
widespread danger of epidemics, many towns used funds from their treasury to pay for 
preventative measures.  For instance, in 1828 the Connecticut town of Salisbury paid $50 to local 
physicians to innoculate its residents with the cowpox bacillus.
84  Public health policy in the 
nineteenth century was closely aligned with sanitation technology and engineering.  For instance, 
the police power of the state to ensure the health and safety of the public was used to enforce the 
provision of running water and the use of water closets in private properties.  These measures led 
to protests, such as occurred when the City of New York passed an act in 1887 that required 
tenement houses to provide running water on all floors because of health and safety reasons.  The 
owners of one such tenement (oddly enough, a church) claimed that the costs of installing such 
facilities were so high as to constitute a taking of private property.  And indeed, Ellen Richards, an 
MIT chemist, estimated that the cost of improved sanitation and fittings in homes had increased 
the cost of house construction by $15,000 in the period between 1850 and 1900.  The takings 
argument was rejected by the appellate court, which pointed out that “Hand rails to stairs, hoisting 
shafts to be inclosed, automatic doors to elevators, automatic shifters for throwing off belts or 
pulleys, and fire escapes on the outside of certain factories, .... Under the police power persons and 
property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort 
and health of the public.”
85    
                                                           
84 Landon v. Humphrey, 9 Conn. 209; 1832. Similarly, the Philadelphia City Council in 1798 commissioned the 
eminent engineer Benjamin Henry Latrobe to design a public water system, in order to counter fears that contaminated 
water was responsible for outbreaks of yellow fever.   However,  the subjects of quarantines such as merchant ships or 
owners of tenements were just as likely to be forced to underwrite the expenses themselves. 
85 The Health Department of the City of New York, Appellant, v. The Rector, Church Wardens and Vestrymen of   46
The U.S. Supreme Court tended to support the actions of state health officials acting in the 
public interest, to extent that it was argued that the state did not have to provide evidence to justify 
its public health policies as long as they were in accordance with “common beliefs.”
86  The 
dangers of such unfettered powers were illustrated in the eugenics movement that developed 
towards the end of the nineteenth century.  At that time genetic science, studies of evolutionary 
biology and heredity, as well as biostatistics and sociology, combined to reach the conclusion that 
the genetic composition of the population should be regulated by statute.
87  These supposedly 
scientific rationales provided an impetus for policies that ranged from restrictive immigration laws, 
to the forced sterilization of individuals with allegedly undesirable genetic characteristics.  In 1896 
Connecticut restricted the ability of epileptics and mentally disabled persons to marry, and similar 
laws were enacted in more than twenty states including Kansas, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan and 
Indiana. In Re Thomson, 169 N.Y.S. 638 (1918), examined the constitutionality of a 1912 law that 
New York passed to permit the sterilization of mentally disabled adults in its institutions.
88  The 
court ruled that the statute violated the equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment, noting 
that a similar law had been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.   
Although a number of  state judges joined in restricting or overturning such laws, the Supreme 
Court of the United States affirmed these policies on the grounds of public interest.  Advances in 
medical technology meant that sterilization could readily and safely be effected in males by 
vasectomy and in females by salpingectomy rather than more drastic invasive measures.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Trinity Church in the City of New York, 145 N.Y. 32; 39 N.E. 833; 1895. 
86 “The possibility that the belief may be wrong, and that science may yet show it to be wrong, is not conclusive; for 
the legislature has the right to pass laws which, according to the common belief of the people, are adapted to  prevent 
the spread of contagious diseases,” Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 1905. 
87 Philip R.Reilly, The Surgical Solution:  A History of Involuntary Sterilization in the  United States, Baltimore:  
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, provides an overview of the eugenics movement. Paul A. Lombardo, 
“Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to  Reproductive Freedom,” vol. 13 Journal 
of Contemp. Health L. & Policy 1 (1996)  contends (p. 1) that "the most powerful vehicle of the eugenic ideology was 
the law." 
88 The court’s opinion noted that “This statute grows out of studies and efforts of those who are interested in the 
subject of eugenics, which has to do with the improvement of the population by taking advantage of laws of heredity; 
with improving through better breeding. It deals with the inheritance of traits; with changes in population through 
differential fecundity; the greater or less fecundity of the different classes of population; with changes of population 
from emigration; or better or worse strains, with hereditary basis of the traits of population.”   47
court’s approval of compulsory sterilization drew on the public health analogy of compulsory 
vaccination, which served the public interest as well as the interest of the parties directly involved 
irrespective of their individual wishes.
89 
iv) Automobiles 
The automobile for some is the most characteristic icon of the American way of life. In 
1920 only 1 percent of American homes had central heating, but 26 percent owned automobiles; 
by 1930 this number had increased to 60 percent, and as early as 1917 the United States accounted 
for 85 percent of the world’s motor cars. The automobile, to an even greater extent than the 
railroad or other transportation innovations, changed patterns of work, crime, leisure and 
residence.   As early as 1906, the author of a legal treatise pointed out that, although “... many of 
the cases merely have called for the application of established rules of law, in dealing with the 
motor vehicle,” it was also true that “many branches of the law are being affected by the horseless 
carriage figuring in litigation.  Where the automobile’s permeating influence will stop is beyond 
prophesy.  It is certain, however, that the motor car, including everything connected with it, is 
bound to be the subject of a vast amount of litigation in the future...”
 90  By 1931, the same author’s 
Encyclopedia of Automobile Law ran to twenty volumes.  Figure 8 confirms his assessment of the 
legal impact of the automobile, as demonstrated by the rapid increase in both state and federal 
litigation.   
Although litigation increased markedly, the figure also indicates that federal courts did not 
play a major role in the public policies that developed towards motor vehicles.  We may speculate 
                                                           
89 Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that “The public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be 
strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt 
to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, 
if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can 
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination 
is broad enough to cover cutting the fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”  Only Justice Butler 
dissented. (Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)). 
90 Preface, pp. vi-vii. Huddy, Xenophon P., The Law of Automobiles, Matthew Bender & Co., 1906. The family 
agency doctrine is described in  the seventh edition of this work, published in 1924.  Arthur F. Curtis, who wrote the 
preface for the 1924 edition, noted that “The ever increasing number of decisions relating to the law of automobiles 
brings new burden to the lawyer.  The question constantly before him is “How can I keep step with the progress in 
this, the most actively litigated branch of the law?”   48
whether this would have been the case if the interstate highways had been constructed more 
rapidly, or whether the decentralized nature of motor vehicle ownership necessarily encouraged 
state governance.  The common carrier concept was applied to commercial motor vehicles, but 
analogies from the era of the railroads proved to be of limited relevance, and the doctrine was 
modified almost beyond recognition.   Rate regulation of common carrier motor vehicles was 
viewed as redundant, because the number of alternative modes of transportation ensured that 
competition protected the public from exorbitant prices.  States established commissions to issue 
licences or “certificates of public convenience and necessity” that regulated the numbers of 
carriers, their routes, modes of operation, and ownership issues such as whether railroads should be 
allowed to offer vehicular common carrier service.  As with all licensing, an argument can be 
made that, despite the stated objectives, the end result was to limit competition rather than uphold 
standards that benefited public safety or convenience. 
The case of the automobile illustrates the ambiguities of attitudes towards overt constraints 
on individual behaviour as opposed to regulations that affected enterprises in the name of the 
public.   Little controversy occurred when states introduced consumption taxes in order to fund the 
expansion and maintenance of public highways.91 These taxes proved to be as popular as any tax 
could be, since the revenues financed roads that benefited all motorists and nonusers of highways 
(such as farmers running machinery) were reimbursed.   However, the dual standard towards 
regulation was evident in responses to measures to deal with automobile torts, which were far 
more costly than those associated with railroads or mining.  Increased use of motor vehicles was 
accompanied by increased harm.
92  The majority of automobile accidents were caused by human 
                                                           
91 In 1919 Oregon introduced gasoline taxes (one cent per gallon), as did New Mexico (two cents) and Colorado (one 
cent).  Other states quickly followed suit, and over time the taxes were increased, so by 1929 gasoline taxes were 
raising $431 million annually. 
92 In 1920 automobiles caused some 11,000 deaths (half of whom were children); in 1924 this number more than 
doubled, over 700,000 injuries were sustained, and property damage was substantial. The fatality rate for automobile 
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error rather than mechanical flaws, and terms such as “speed maniac” or “road hog” had already 
entered the public lexicon at the turn of the century.  Public policy was again required to mediate 
among competing claims.  Efforts included the passage of legislation to provide rules and regulate 
behaviour, appeal to the courts,  and third party means of compensating those who were harmed.  
Safety measures that regulated individual behaviour --  drivers’ tests and licences, vehicle 
registration, age limits, and traffic regulations -- were introduced in a slow and haphazard fashion.   
In the 1920s and 1930s states imposed an inconsistent jumble of regulations on drivers, but 
enforcement was lax and such legislation was not at the forefront of policies towards automobiles.   
Instead, the state courts were rapidly clogged with disputes brought by victims of “jitneys,” 
taxicabs, trucks and privately operated vehicles.  As in all tort cases, the key issues centered on 
liability and on compensation.  When conflicts appeared between existing and former 
technologies,  judges refused to assign unilateral blame, and instead ensured that the lowest cost 
outcome prevailed.  For instance, over 900 lawsuits dealt with the harm caused by cars frightening 
horses.  In  Macomber v. Nichols,  34 Mich. 212 (1876), the judge declared that “Persons making 
use of horses as the means of travel or traffic by the highways have no rights therein superior to 
those who make use of the ways in other modes. ...Horses may be, and often are, frightened by 
locomotives in both town and country, but it would be as reasonable to treat the horse as a public 
nuisance from his tendency to shy and be frightened by unaccustomed objects, as to regard the 
locomotive as a public nuisance from its tendency to frighten the horse.”
93  The standard of the 
time required the driver of the car to defer to horses, since the latter were more common.  
However, when automobiles became the norm, the standard shifted to reflect that fact. 
94  
                                                           
93 Indiana Springs Company v. Brown. 165 Ind. 465; 1905: “In all human activities the law keeps up with 
improvement and progress brought about by discovery and invention, and, in respect to   highways, if the introduction 
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94 In Re Thomas Berry, Supreme Court of California, 147 Cal. 523; 82 P. 44; 1905: “Of course, if the use of 
automobiles gradually becomes more common, there may come a time when an ordinance like the one here in question 
would be unreasonable…”   50
  A significant legal development occurred when courts overturned the privity of contract 
doctrine to take into account the circumstances of automobile manufacture and the complexity of 
the vehicle structure.  Before 1906 there were no cases involving manufacturer’s liability except 
when the  item was held to be inherently dangerous.  In Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Co, the plaintiff 
was seriously injured by a defective tire on his automobile, which had been sold by a retail dealer.  
The court held that no contractual relationship existed between the driver and the manufacturer and 
dismissed the complaint.  Judge Coxe, in his dissent from this decision, implied that the buyer of 
complicated mechanisms of new technologies could not readily judge their safety as well as the 
manufacturer.  Coxe’s argument was similar to the decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 
217 N.Y. 382 (1916), which stated that a manufacturer had a duty of care even to third parties who 
were not directly involved in contractual relations with the firm.  Cardozo rejected the privity of 
contract defence because  the standard approach had to change with the times:  "The maker of this 
car supplied it for the use of purchasers from the dealer.... The dealer was indeed the one person of 
whom it might be said with some approach to certainty that by him the car would not be used. Yet 
the defendant would have us say that he was the one person whom it was under a legal duty to 
protect. The law does not lead us to so inconsequent a conclusion. Precedents drawn from the days 
of travel by stagecoach do not fit the conditions of travel to-day.  The principle that the danger 
must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to the principle do change. They are 
whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization require them to be."  
The appellate court in the Johnson case (Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Co, 261 F. 878;1919) 
affirmed this view. They drew on a shaky analogy to a principle that had always been accepted by 
the common law, likening the automobile manufacturer to a producer of poisonous drugs or 
“imminently dangerous articles” who had a duty of care to the public.  However, Cardozo correctly 
highlighted the extent to which harm could be foreseen: “foresight of the consequences involves 
the creation of a duty.”  Predictability of outcomes was also emphasized in Chittenden v. 
Columbus,  5 Ohio C.C. 84 (1904).   When the court imposed a fine of $25 on a motorist who was   51
exceeding the town speed limit of seven miles, the plaintiff protested that the law illegally 
discriminated against automobiles, since streetcars were allowed to go faster.  The court disagreed 
since, unlike automobiles, streetcars ran on set tracks and could thus be more easily avoided by 
others.  If injury could be foreseen, efficiency required that the law offer incentives to avoid such 
harm by placing liability on those who could avoid it at lowest cost. As Coxe had presciently 
pointed out, the automobile was such a complicated mechanism it was unlikely that the ordinary 
driver could detect a structural deficiency, whereas it was readily within the capability of 
manufacturers to test each part and ensure that it was safe.  A corollary of this doctrine was that the 
federal courts later upheld GM’s right to stipulate that their dealers should use only GM 
replacement parts: exclusive contracts of this sort did not lessen competition but ensured quality 
control, since any defects would have adverse effects on GM’s reputation.
95  
Automobiles influenced the rise of enterprise liability and motivated legal doctrines that 
absolved users from responsibility for their actions on the grounds that technology had outpaced 
their understanding. However, the majority of automobile accidents did not occur because of 
tortious actions by enterprises, but involved harms caused by negligence on the part of drivers or 
pedestrians.   A number of legal innovations were a response to falling prices for the new 
technology that encouraged its diffusion throughout the population.  The first automobile owners 
were wealthy individuals who were likely to hire chauffeurs, which led to legal questions of 
agency that could be subsumed in the existing law of master and servant.  However, the law of 
agency had to be modified when the price of cars fell to the point where ordinary families could 
afford to purchase vehicles that they drove themselves.  The family agency doctrine took into 
account the likelihood that other family members would be just as likely to drive the car as the 
owner, and courts held the owner (generally the father) vicariously liable for the actions of the rest 
of the family.   This holding encouraged the owner of the vehicle to monitor and regulate the 
actions of family members in order to ensure that their behaviour was consistent with safe use. 
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Another result of automobile ownership by ordinary families was that insurance soon 
comprised an important public policy issue.
96  Plaintiffs, even if successful in obtaining a judgment 
for damages, were often unable to collect their dues because the impecunious automobile owner 
had purchased the vehicle on an installment plan and was financially unable to pay. Early 
insurance companies lacked information to compute and rate risks, so the majority chose to avoid 
universal coverage and limited their policies to specific contingencies such as theft or fire.  The 
problems for insurance writers of uneconomical risks were compounded by inconsistent state and 
municipal regulations.  In some states, insurance liability only applied to commercial vehicles or 
major urban centers, and some cities like Los Angeles and Cleveland passed local ordinances 
independently of state laws.  Safety advocates turned to the analogy of workers’ compensation to 
lobby for state-sponsored automobile insurance or regulation of the insurance industry.  After 1910 
the National Workmen’s Compensation Service Bureau computed rates for liability and property 
damage insurance for automobiles.  However, lobbyists for state-sponsored insurance plans along 
the lines of workmen’s compensation failed to achieve their objectives and states continued to vary 
in their treatment of insurance.   The major policy towards automobile torts remains that of 
insurance or compensation for harm done, rather than self-insurance or limitations on use. 
CONCLUSION 
“The final cause of law is the welfare of society.” 
--Benjamin Cardozo
97  
We live in interesting times; but so did the population of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  The elevation in standards of living during this period was associated with the rapid 
diffusion of inventions that transformed the daily life of ordinary citizens.  Technological change 
was not uniformly benevolent and it is appalling to modern observers to assess the costs in terms 
of injuries, mortality, morbidity and environmental damage.  Innovations also had redistributive 
effects, such as interference with existing water rights, the fall in returns to railroad stockholders 
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when automotive vehicles substituted for passenger and freight transportation, or even the 
increased benefits to personal beauty that resulted from the rise of service-oriented occupations.  
The incentives to invent and innovate were influenced by the rules and standards of social and 
economic exchange, and in turn those rules had to accommodate the new technologies: “the great 
inventions that embodied the power of steam and electricity, the railroad and the steamship, the 
telegraph and the telephone, have built up new customs and new law.”
98   
This paper suggested that one of the reasons for the relative success of the United States 
during the long nineteenth century was its dependence on an array of institutions that proved to be 
sufficiently flexible to provide incentives for the creation of technological innovations and also the 
means to manage their use and consequences in the public interest.  These institutions included 
(but clearly were not limited to) the private market, the political process vested in the legislature, 
administrative regulation, insurance, and the legal system.  I have deliberately highlighted the role 
of the market economy and that of the common law.  President Roosevelt did likewise in his 1908 
address to Congress,  noting that “for the peaceful progress of our people during the twentieth 
century we shall owe most to those judges who hold to a twentieth century economic and social 
philosophy and not to a long outgrown philosophy, which was itself the product of primitive 
economic conditions.”  In short, the democratic market orientation of the American legal system 
played a key role in the advances of this era.   
The United States benefited from the talents of the extraordinary cadre of individuals who 
comprised the judiciary.  Courts confronted the continuous stream of mankind about its 
commonplace business of life, and from these unpropitious materials created decisions that were 
based on analogies drawn from historical experience, logic, and the attempt to serve the 
community in general.  An analysis of law reports supports the notion that the judiciary objectively 
weighed costs and benefits, and ultimately the decisions that prevailed promoted social welfare 
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rather than the interests of any single group.   American judges understood that one of the best 
means to protect the rights of customers and to constrain the power of corporations was through 
market competition. The legal system formed a decentralized method of mediation that was 
continuously calibrated to the changes that affected society, technological or otherwise.  This is not 
to say that every judge was of the calibre of Joseph Story or Benjamin Cardozo, but a system of 
appeals assured that “the tide rises and falls, but the sands of error crumble.”
99   
Regulation, on the other hand, was too often a function of a unique cataclysmic event  -- a 
stock market crash, a fire or train collision that results in much loss of life, a single epidemic or 
terrorist attack, the sinking of a ship --  that gripped the public imagination and provided the 
political impetus for policies that might have been appropriate for that event but subsequently 
proved to be ineffective guides for future actions or outcomes.  Regulation and “protective” 
legislation typically occurred because of political interests rather than economic reasons, and often 
constituted a veiled attempt at raising barriers to entry, or a way to increase the costs of 
competitors and of disdained social groups. Regulatory provisions were most effective when they 
simply codified the historical tendencies of the common law and ultimately depended on 
enforcement from the federal legal system.  Administrative bodies such as the ICC and the FTC at 
times were headed by legal practitioners:  Brandeis is credited (or blamed) for the establishment of 
the FTC and SEC, and Cooley was the first ICC Commissioner.  Rather than substitutes, the legal 
system was a valuable and necessary complement to state and federal regulatory systems, but their 
relative importance varied with time and circumstance.   
Although the nineteenth century is frequently characterized as the heyday of untethered 
competition, one is impressed with the extent to which new technologies were both enabled and 
constrained by common law holdings in order to conform to prevailing conceptions of social 
welfare.  The major innovations that we considered here – the railroad, the telegraph, medical 
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technologies and public health – were regarded as integral to social progress.  Because they were 
vested with a public purpose, private enterprises were conscripted to serve the needs of the 
community.  It is therefore not surprising that judges such as Cardozo saw the ultimate objective of 
law to be the promotion of “social utility.”
100 From this perspective, neither is it surprising that 
courts ensured the protection of railroad passengers, consumers, children, debtors and other classes 
of society, at the same time that they were attempting to provide incentives for the growth of 
private enterprise.   
The advent of each new technology created uncertainty about how the law would be 
interpreted, which analogies will be applied, and what the prevailing standard would be.   This 
likely accounts, at least in part, for the increase in the number of lawsuits that initially occurred, 
even after adjusting for the scale of use.  The courts were typically at the forefront of policies 
towards technology in the nineteenth century, and provided a gauge of legislative needs.  
Legislation encountered the technologies of the day with a lag and tended to follow signals 
emanating from the conflicts before the courts.   Thus, legal decisions, although statute-bound and 
based on historical experience, were to some extent forward-looking. We can only speculate about 
the subsequent decline in litigation rates that all of the figures exhibit, but the number of litigated 
disputes likely fell because of learning by all parties involved, greater certainty about standards, 
the introduction of new legislation that resolved outstanding issues, or in some instances as a result 
of a shifting of oversight from the courts to other institutions. 
Patents and (to a lesser extent) copyrights were regarded as fundamental to industrial and 
cultural progress, and protected  as such at the federal level from the very beginning of nationhood.  
As a result, interstate markets developed early on with extensive trade in rights and subdivided 
rights.  Inventors were regarded as public benefactors, because (unlike monopolists) they 
contributed new improvements that expanded the frontiers of production and consumption.  
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Therefore,  the law was quite unambiguous in its objective of protecting legitimate patent rights in 
order to provide incentives for inventive activity and diffusion.  However, it was necessary for 
judges in equity jurisdiction to thwart patent owners who attempted to extend their rights beyond 
their just bounds to obtain monopoly control over the entire industry.   Copyrights, on the other 
hand, provided weaker incentives for new expression and  risked reducing public access to 
knowledge.  New technologies presented further dilemmas because they increased the scope and 
duration of copyright protection and had potentially deleterious effects on the public domain.  In 
the attempt to protect public welfare, legal innovations expanded beyond traditional copyright 
doctrines to noncopyright holdings under unfair competition, trade secrets, and the right to privacy. 
In the context of technological innovations, market integration ran up against the 
constraints of individual state policies that inhibited standardization and increased the costs of 
transacting.  The first national enterprises -- the railroads and the telegraph companies -- appealed 
to the federal courts to apply provisions of the Constitution.  Had they failed, the consequences 
would have been pervasive not just for big business and market integration, but for the attempts of 
social reformers who wished to override the political biases of state legislatures in areas as 
disparate as racial segregation and abortion.  While federalism was a prerequisite for market 
integration, the converse did not necessarily hold, since general market integration did not preclude 
state oversight, especially for technologies whose use was predominantly local.  During the period 
under review roads were largely intrastate and unconnected, making long distance travel 
prohibitively costly for most purposes.  This comprised at least one reason why the law towards 
automobile users was predominantly state-oriented, and relatively few federal questions arose in 
the courts.  Instead, federal policies were mainly directed towards resolving free-rider problems 
among states by matching state funding to construct interstate highways. 
The automobile industry quickly made important contributions to law, economy and 
technology.  Despite its prominence, few scholars have addressed the legal implications of the 
automobile, an omission that is all the more noticeable when compared to the attention accorded to   57
other major innovations such as the railroad. Although the transportation function of both railroads 
and automobiles was the same, few analogies were drawn between them.  It might be argued that 
the railroad’s legal significance owed to the public need for laws to deal with the harms to 
consumers and workers from accidents, and the need to regulate its monopolistic strategies.  Yet,  
third party effects associated with automobiles, in the form of injuries to children and other 
bystanders, was far greater than in the case of railroads. In contrast, even with growing market 
integration, the automobile was associated with decentralized consumer use, harms to ordinary 
citizens by other ordinary citizens, few interstate issues and increased oversight by states and 
municipalities.  The decentralization of activities that occurred with widespread automobile 
ownership meant that the public would have had to bear the consequences of pervasive regulation. 
Instead of legal or regulatory measures to significantly limit private use, the scale of harms 
afflicted by automobile users motivated an institutional shift towards private insurance. Policy 
makers were reluctant to follow the vaccination analogy that allowed incursions into the private 
sphere of consumer activities in the name of the public interest. 
This survey of innovations in law and technology has not identified discrete 
transformations in law; neither does it detect monolithic tendencies towards centralization or 
increased administrative regulation.  Still less does the evidence support the claims of subsidy 
hypothesis.  Effective policies towards innovations required a social calculus that was far more 
subtle than the promotion of the interests of any one specific group in society.  Technological 
advances altered the costs and benefits of transacting within a particular network of rules and 
standards, and institutions proved to be sufficiently flexible to encompass these changes.   In short, 
since the founding of the Republic, institutions have altered as the scale and scope of market and 
society have evolved, but the central policy objective of promoting the public interest has remained 
the same.  That is, after all, one of the chief virtues of a society that is bound and enabled by 
prescient Constitutional principles.   58
The perusal of legal decisions to detect prevailing tendencies is a hazardous undertaking.  
The analyst, however objective and well-meaning, risks misinterpretation or selective use of the 
evidence to reconfirm a pre-existing  bias.  However, we can gain some insights from the 
experience of developing countries today.  In many nations political elites have captured 
institutions to further the narrow self-interest of these privileged groups.  Institutional sclerosis, the 
prevalence of inefficient regulatory bureaucracies, corruption and inadequate legal systems have 
resulted in widespread poverty, despair, and the absence of incentives for increased productivity.   
If the subsidy thesis is correct, and the American legal system was early on captured to promote 
the interests of a favoured few, it is quite unlikely that the United States would have experienced 
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Figure 1
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Source: B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “The Early Development of Intellectual 
Property Institutions in the United States,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15 (3) 2001: 
233-246.  Notes:   The figure shows patents granted, per million residents in the U.S. population.   
 
 
Notes and Source: Lexis-Nexis, federal lawsuits database.  The count comprises the number of 
cases in which Hotchkiss v. Greenwood was cited in relation to the doctrine of nonobviousness, by 
decade.  Note the dramatic decline in applications of this doctrine in the 1990s, coinciding with the 
rise of software, the Internet, and business method patents. 
 
 















Safety Related Inventions in Railroad and All Sectors, 








































































Source: U.S. Patent Office, 1840-1940. 
Notes: Inventions are considered to be safety related if the patent specification includes two or 
more appearances of variations of the word “safe.”  Changing the frequency affects levels but does 
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Figure 4








































































Source: Lexis-Nexis database of state and federal reported cases. 
 
Figure 5
Railroads: State and Federal Lawsuits Relative to Usage, 









































Notes and Sources: Lexis-Nexis.  Usage reflects millions of passenger miles traveled, from the 
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Figure 6




























































































Notes and Sources: Lexis-Nexis (see above).  Usage data from Historical Statistics of the United 
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Figure 8



























































Source: Lexis-Nexis database of state and federal reported cases. 
 
 